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Regents: Resurrecting Animus/Renewing
Discriminatory Intent
William D. Araiza*
The Supreme Court’s decision in Department of Homeland Security v.
Regents of the University of California, invalidating the Trump
Administration’s rescission of the Obama-era Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, focused mainly on administrative
law requirements of reasoned decision-making. Commentary on the case
has also focused on that aspect of the decision. But a sleeper issue in the
case is the Court’s rejection of the plaintiffs’ equal protection animus
claim. Perhaps counter-intuitively, that rejection may well portend a
revival of the animus concept that many had speculated the Court would
abandon after its primary proponent, Justice Anthony Kennedy, left the
Court.
This Article considers what Regents’ treatment of the animus claim
means for that concept. Part II provides the necessary background,
tracing the Court’s engagement with animus from its early appearance in
equal protection cases to its borrowing (by Justice Kennedy) into Free
Exercise Clause cases, and, with Regents, its return to equal protection.
Part III argues that the Court’s very act of engaging the animus issue in
Regents is significant and establishes the viability of animus claims going
forward.
Part IV turns to the substance of the Court’s engagement with
animus. It examines how Regents deployed the Court’s discriminatory
intent jurisprudence in its treatment of the animus claim. It concludes
that the Court’s connection of animus and discriminatory intent
jurisprudence recalls the Court’s early understanding of the intent idea,
before it rigidified into the familiar classification exercise we know today.
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Part V considers the implications of this new connection. For animus
doctrine, a new, explicit connection to discriminatory intent methodology
places the animus concept on a sturdier doctrinal foundation. The
influence of this connection on intent doctrine itself is more mixed but
intriguing. If intent ends up being further suffused with notions of
subjective ill will, a new connection with animus may make it harder for
equality advocates to prove discriminatory intent. On the other hand, if
the connection with animus results in a more holistic, less rigid intent
inquiry, the way might be open for successful defenses of remedial
race-conscious government action, especially when that action employs
formally race-neutral means.
The connection Regents has drawn between animus and intent raises
the prospect of renewing both concepts. Nevertheless, risks attend this
doctrinal evolution, which requires careful monitoring of the use litigants
and courts make of these renewed doctrinal tools.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in Department of Homeland
Security v. Regents of the University of California1 focused mainly on
administrative law requirements of reasoned decision-making when it
struck down the Trump Administration’s decision to rescind the
Obama-era Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program.
Preliminary commentary on the case has also focused on the reasoned
decision-making issue.2 But in a part of his opinion that spoke only for
four Justices, Chief Justice Roberts rejected the plaintiffs’ constitutional
argument that the Administration’s rescission of DACA reflected
unconstitutional animus against Latinos. While he and three liberal
Justices rejected the argument that the plaintiffs had pled a plausible
claim of unconstitutional animus,3 what is noteworthy is that he reached
the animus issue at all and how he deployed discriminatory intent
doctrine to examine the closely related, but not identical, concept of
animus.
Those two aspects of his analysis reveal, respectively, that animus
remains a live concept at the Court despite the departure of Justice
Kennedy, its longtime champion, and that animus contains with it a
generative potential for equal protection law more generally. Both of
these conclusions have implications for the future path of equality law.
To quote Justice Scalia from a different context, “[w]e will be sorting out
the consequences of [the animus analysis in Regents] for years to
come.”4
1

Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020).
See, e.g., Special Feature: Symposium on the Court’s Ruling in DHS v. Regents of the
University of California, Trump v. NAACP and Wolf v. Vidal, SCOTUSBLOG,
https://www.scotusblog.com/category/special-features/symposia-on-rulings-fromoctober-term-2019/symposium-on-the-courts-ruling-in-dhs-v-regents-of-theuniversity-of-california (online symposium on Regents, with all of the commentators
focusing exclusively on the administrative law aspects of the case).
3 Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion on the animus point was joined by Justices
Ginsberg, Breyer, and Kagan. See Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1899, 1915–16. Justice
Sotomayor dissented on this point, although, as set forth later, she employed the same
approach as the plurality. See id. at 1916–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). Thus, the components of the
Chief Justice’s analysis relevant to this Article command the assent of a majority. The
four conservative Justices merely concurred in the result rejecting the animus claim,
without speaking to the plurality’s analytical approach. See id. at 1919 n.1 (Thomas, J.,
joined by Alito and Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 1932 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). Note that the Thomas and Kavanaugh opinions are styled as concurrences in the
judgment, rather than simple concurrences. Since the only part of the decision with
which those Justices agreed was the equal protection component, their failure to concur
in the opinion suggests a refusal to sign on to the Chief Justice’s animus analysis.
4 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2
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This Article commences that sorting out. Part II begins by
summarizing equal protection animus,5 its borrowing into Free Exercise
and Establishment Clause jurisprudence,6 and, finally, the plurality’s
reasoning in Regents.7 That summary provides the background for the
analysis in Parts III–V. After Section III.A introduces the relationship
between animus and discriminatory intent, Section III.B considers the
significance of the fact that the plurality chose even to address the
animus issue. Despite the plurality’s rejection of the plaintiffs’ animus
claim, it remains striking that the plurality chose to address it at all,
given that it had already decided the case on a narrower,
nonconstitutional ground that quite arguably mooted the animus issue.
The plurality’s decision nevertheless to engage the animus argument
was thus significant, especially given the animus idea’s close association
with Justice Anthony Kennedy, who left the Court in 2018. Its decision
to do so solidifies the status of animus as an option for future equality
litigators.
Beyond its bare decision to engage it, the Regents Court’s actual
analysis of the animus issue is also noteworthy. As Part II explains,8
Regents’ animus analysis relied heavily on the Court’s methodology for
identifying discriminatory intent—that is, the well-known
discriminatory intent factors from Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation.9 This reliance might
not seem surprising, since the animus inquiry might appear closely
related to the intent inquiry for which the Arlington Heights factors were
developed. But as Section III.A explains, the two inquiries are not
identical under current doctrine.
Even though the animus and intent concepts are not identical, Part
IV reveals intriguing connections between them. Section IV.A builds the
foundation for that claim by revealing how the Arlington Heights intent
factors came to be deployed in a subtly different way via their
borrowing into Religion Clause cases. That borrowing had the effect of
moving those factors away from a single-minded focus on intent to
classify and toward an inquiry into ultimate invidiousness. It also
explains how Regents borrowed those subtly transformed factors back
into equal protection analysis.

5
6
7
8
9

See infra Section II,A.
See infra Section II.B.
See infra Section II.C.
See infra Section II.C.
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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Section IV.B explains how the Court’s move more firmly connected
the animus and intent inquiries. Section IV.B.1 begins by recounting, in
highly abbreviated form, the evolution of the Court’s intent
jurisprudence away from its early focus on ultimate invidiousness and
toward its current focus on classificatory intent as a threshold inquiry
to the heightened scrutiny performed any time a law was deemed to
have classified. Section IV.B.2 explains how Regents’ use of the Arlington
Heights discriminatory intent factors to establish animus creates an
analytical structure that mirrors that used by the Court in its early
applications of intent doctrine.
Part V considers the implications, for both animus and
discriminatory intent analysis, of Regents’ creation of this connection.
With regard to the former, Section V.A explains that the importation of
the Arlington Heights inquiry into animus analysis brings structure and
stability to what heretofore has been a remarkably ad hoc inquiry.
When combined with the brute fact that the Court has now at least
entertained an animus argument in the post-Kennedy era, the
agreement among five Justices on a doctrinal structure for such claims
provides not just an invitation to litigators to make such arguments but
also a coherent roadmap for how to present them. As Section V.A
explains, this is a positive development, given the potential for animus
to supplement the Court’s traditional but rapidly obsolescing
tiered-scrutiny-based equal protection structure.
With regard to Regents’ impact on discriminatory intent doctrine,
Section V.B explains that the picture is mixed but nevertheless
intriguing. One troubling possible result from Regents is that the
concept of discriminatory intent will become even more closely
associated with subjective ill will—the common understanding of
“animus.” In many scholars’ views, discriminatory intent is already too
focused on such subjective ill will;10 thus, a more explicit association
with the concept of animus would simply raise the hurdle equality
litigators currently must surmount when challenging facially neutral
government action that has disparate sex or racial effects. This is a real
risk.

10 See, e.g., Barbara Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and
the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 959 (1993) (recognizing
a structural aspect of white supremacy that is not accounted for by an understanding of
discrimination as a purely subjective phenomenon); Sheila Foster, Intent and
Incoherence, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1065, 1082 (1998) (concluding that the Supreme Court’s
discriminatory intent jurisprudence requires “a specific desire to harm the affected
group,” a standard “that can be fairly equated with malice”).
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On the positive side of the ledger, an inquiry focused more
holistically on invidiousness might protect from judicial invalidation of
race-neutral but nevertheless race-conscious government action. More
distantly (and speculatively), the connection between animus and
discriminatory intent carries the potential to destabilize the Court’s
rigid insistence on treating all racial classifications the same, regardless
of their segregative or remedial motivations. These developments, to
the extent they materialize, would flow from an understanding of
discriminatory intent that hearkens back to its 1970s roots as a search
for invidious government action.
Regents offers the potential—if still distant and speculative—to
return the concept of discriminatory intent to that original, more holistic
understanding. It thus offers the potential for doing more than simply
resurrecting the animus concept from the doctrinal discard pile to
which Justice Kennedy’s departure might have been thought to consign
it. Rather, Regents also holds the potential to renew the discriminatory
intent idea to which animus has now been explicitly connected. Part VI
concludes.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF ANIMUS
The progression of animus doctrine at the Supreme Court is
well-known and has been thoroughly recounted by scholars.11 This Part
begins by briefly summarizing the equal protection “animus
quadrilogy”:12 Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,13 City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center,14 Romer v. Evans,15 and United States v.
Windsor.16 It then examines how animus-related reasoning migrated
into the religion clauses. It begins that examination with Free Exercise
Clause doctrine, starting in the 1993 case Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye v. City of Hialeah17 and continuing, a quarter-century later, in
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,18 before
examining the Court’s Establishment Clause analysis in Trump v.

11

See, e.g., WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW (NYU
Press 2017); Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection From Animus, 2013 SUP.
CT. REV. 183 (2014); Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
887 (2012).
12 Carpenter, supra note 11, at 183.
13 United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
14 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
15 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
16 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
17 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
18 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
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Hawaii.19 Part II concludes by considering the plurality’s discussion of
animus in Regents.20 This brief tour sets the stage for considering the
current state of animus doctrine and its potential future evolution.21
A. The Quadrilogy
Equal protection animus doctrine22 originated in 1973 in
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno.23 In Moreno, the Court struck
down an amendment to the federal food stamp law that denied food
stamp benefits to unrelated persons living as a unit.24 Writing for the
Court, Justice Brennan found no rational connection between the benefit
cutoff and the overall goals of the food stamp law to stimulate
agricultural demand and combat hunger.25 Turning to the amendment
itself, he identified a legislator’s statement in the sparse legislative
history stating that the amendment was designed to cut off benefits to
“hippies” and “hippie communes.”26 Justice Brennan found that
justification inadmissible, using language that became foundational to
animus doctrine:
The challenged classification clearly cannot be sustained by
reference to this congressional purpose. For if the
constitutional conception of “equal protection of the laws”
means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.27
The Court’s rejection of the anti-hippie explanation did not end its
analysis. Rather, the Court pressed on, considering other justifications

19

Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
See infra Section II.C.
21 For more detailed examinations of these cases, see ARAIZA, supra note 11, chs. 2–5
(discussing Moreno, Cleburne, Romer and Windsor); Carpenter, supra note 11, at 204–15
(discussing Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer in more detail); id. at 215–21 (discussing
Windsor); Pollvogt, supra note 11, at 901–15 (discussing Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer,
as well as Palmore v. Sidoti, one of the “progenitors of the animus doctrine relied on in
subsequent animus decisions like Cleburne and Romer”).
22 This “equal protection” qualifier is necessary because a variety of federal civil
rights statutes have been interpreted to require some level or type of animus on the part
of the alleged violator. See, e.g., Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263
(1993) (considering the type of animus necessary to state a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3)). Moreover, a strain of animus-related reasoning has migrated into Religion
Clause cases. See infra Section II.B (discussing that migration).
23 United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
24 Id. at 529.
25 Id. at 535–38.
26 Id. at 534.
27 Id. (emphasis in original).
20
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the government offered for the law.28 But its analysis (and rejection) of
those latter justifications was more searching than is normally the case
under the typical, extraordinarily deferential approach to rational basis
review that by 1973 had become the norm in cases not dealing with race
or any other suspect class.29
A dozen years later, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, the
Court relied on Moreno to strike down a city council’s denial of a permit
allowing the establishment, in a residential neighborhood, of a group
home for intellectually disabled persons.30 The Court began its analysis
by rejecting the lower court’s conclusion that intellectual disability was
a quasi-suspect classification.31 Nevertheless, it then warned, quoting
Moreno, that “some objectives—such as ‘a bare . . . desire to harm a
politically unpopular group’—are not legitimate state interests.”32 It
made good on that warning when it concluded that the city’s decision
rested on nearby residents’ illegitimate fear and dislike of intellectually
disabled persons.33 Again following Moreno’s template, the Court then
considered and rejected the government’s more legitimate explanations
for its permit refusal, scrutinizing those explanations more carefully
than is normally the case under rational basis review.34

28

See id. at 535–38.
See id. at 545–46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (pointing out the Court’s deviation
from standard rational basis review). For a canonical example of such extraordinarily
deferential rational basis review, see Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106
(1949). To be sure, by 1973, the Court had already begun reviewing legitimacy
classifications with a skepticism that could only be described as more searching than
traditional Railway Express-style review. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S.
164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins.
Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968). Nevertheless, legitimacy, soon to be joined by several other
characteristics, was elevated to quasi-suspect status and accorded explicitly heightened
review. By contrast, the cases that flowered from Moreno never featured explicitly
heightened scrutiny. But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that the animus cases flowering from Moreno
did in fact feature a heightened form of rational basis review).
30 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446–48 (1985).
31 Id. at 435, 442.
32 Id. at 446–47 (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534).
33 Id. at 448–49.
34 See id. at 455–60 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(identifying the unusual stringency of the Court’s rational basis scrutiny). Justice
Marshall nevertheless agreed with the decision to strike down the city’s decision but did
so on the ground that intellectual disability should be considered a suspect classification
that in this case operated to deprive persons of the important interest in establishing a
home. See id. at 473 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
29
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After nearly a dozen more years, the Court again returned to the
animus concept in Romer v. Evans.35 In Romer, the Court struck down
Amendment 2 to the Colorado Constitution, a voter-enacted initiative
that prohibited any state entity from taking any action protecting
against discrimination on the basis of being lesbian, gay, or bisexual
(“LGB”). Without pausing to consider whether sexual orientation
should be a suspect classification, the Court, speaking through Justice
Kennedy, struck the law down. The Court first concluded that the law
failed traditional rational basis review, given the disconnect between its
imposition of a broad disability on LGB persons across every aspect of
social life and any possible legitimate justification. Justice Kennedy then
concluded that that disconnect left animus against LGB persons as the
only explanation for Amendment 2.36
The last equal protection case decided on an animus grounds
before Regents was United States v. Windsor,37 decided in 2013.38 In
Windsor, the Court, again speaking through Justice Kennedy, struck
down Section 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which
defined marriage for federal purposes as a union between one man and
one woman. Justice Kennedy began his discussion of the merits39 by
observing that states, not the federal government, normally defined
marriage.40 The federal intrusion into that decision-making realm
provided the backdrop for the Court’s argument that Congress’s goal in
enacting Section 3 was to demean the existence of LGB persons by
refusing federal recognition of marriages that states had seen fit to
recognize. Relying on DOMA’s effects, its legislative history, and even
the statute’s title, Justice Kennedy concluded that “interference with the
equal dignity of same-sex marriages, conferred by the States in the
35

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
See id. at 634–35.
37 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
38 In Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), the Court employed substantive due
process to strike down Texas’s law criminalizing same-sex sex. Justice O’Connor, who
had joined the Court’s 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986),
upholding a sodomy law against a due process challenge, declined to join the majority’s
opinion overruling Bowers. She concurred, however, on equal protection grounds,
concluding that Texas’s singling out of same-sex sodomy for prohibition reflected
animus against LGB persons. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579, 581 (2003)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Notably, she cited Moreno, Cleburne, and
Romer, and explained them as standing for the proposition that “[w]hen a law exhibits
. . . a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have applied a more searching
form of rational basis review to strike down such laws under the Equal Protection
Clause.” Id. at 580.
39 The Court began its analysis by considering whether it had jurisdiction to reach
the merits and concluded that it did. See Windsor, 570 U.S. at 757.
40 Id. at 764.
36
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exercise of their sovereign power, was more than an incidental effect of
[DOMA],” but rather was “its essence.”41 In the last substantive
paragraph of the majority opinion, the Court referred quickly and
obliquely to the rational basis standard, encasing that reference in
statements about the federal government’s “disparage[ment]” of and
“injur[y]” to the same-sex couples DOMA affected: “The federal statute
is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect
to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws,
sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”42
This brief summary reveals several features of animus analysis.
First, the Court has applied that doctrine when traditional, explicitly
heightened scrutiny is, for whatever reason, unavailable or remains
unmentioned. The Court in Cleburne employed animus only after it
rejected heightened scrutiny for the intellectually disabled, it failed to
even mention the possibility of heightened scrutiny for sexual
orientation in Romer and Windsor, and few people would have found
plausible any argument for heightened scrutiny for hippies in Moreno.
Second, the doctrine is deeply under-theorized. These cases left
unanswered basic questions such as the methodology for uncovering
animus43 and the effect of an animus conclusion.44

41

Id. at 770.
Id. at 775.
43 The evidence seemingly relied on by the Court in these cases ranges from explicit
legislative statements (Moreno and Windsor) to legislative acquiescence to constituent
pressure (Cleburne) to the unusually broad disability the challenged law imposed
(Romer).
44 Note that in Moreno and Cleburne, the Court, after acknowledging the
animus-based justifications for the laws challenged in those cases, nevertheless
continued on to review the government’s more legitimate justifications, albeit with a
more skeptical eye. See supra notes 28, 34 and accompanying text. This approach
suggests that an animus conclusion is not necessarily fatal to the law’s constitutionality,
creating the odd possibility that a law grounded in part in animus might nevertheless be
constitutional. See ARAIZA, supra note 11, at ch. 8 (noting this oddity). But see Pollvogt,
supra note 11, at 930 (concluding that an animus finding causes the Court to reject more
legitimate justifications for a challenged law, and thus concluding that such a finding
acts as “a doctrinal silver bullet”). In her concurring opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, Justice
O’Connor artfully elided the question of the effect of an animus finding when she stated
that “[w]hen a law exhibits . . . a [bare] desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we
have [in earlier cases] applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike
down such laws under the Equal Protection Clause.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice O’Connor’s careful
writing left unanswered the question whether, in those earlier cases (Moreno, Cleburne,
and Romer), the strike down occurred more or less automatically as a result of the
animus finding, or whether instead further judicial examination was required before the
Court struck them down.
42
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The third characteristic is that Justice Kennedy was the centerpiece
of the animus cases decided while he was on the Court.45 He was the key
fifth vote in Windsor. He wrote the opinions in both Romer and
Windsor.46 Moreover, he wrote two important opinions in Religion
Clause cases that imported animus-type reasoning into the First
Amendment, while explicitly linking that reasoning to elements of the
Court’s discriminatory intent jurisprudence.47 The next section
considers those two cases, as well as a third religion case that also
employed such reasoning.
B. The Religion Clause Cases
In three cases arising under either the Free Exercise or
Establishment Clauses, the Court has explicitly or implicitly employed
animus-type reasoning. The first two—Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye
v. City of Hialeah48 and Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission49—were written by Justice Kennedy and involved the Free
Exercise Clause. The third—Trump v. Hawaii50—arose under the
Establishment Clause. While all three cases focused on invidious
singling out—what we might intuit as animus51—the most important
element of these cases for our purposes is their approach for discerning
whether such animus existed.
Begin with the Free Exercise Clause opinions written by Justice
Kennedy. Those cases must be understood in the context of the Court’s
1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith,52 where the Court held
that generally applicable laws that burden religiously motivated
conduct only incidentally do not trigger heightened scrutiny under the
Free Exercise Clause. Thus, the plaintiffs in both Lukumi and
Masterpiece argued that the laws they challenged were invalid under
Smith because the government singled out the plaintiffs’ religious
conduct.

45

See infra note 105 (citing scholarship recognizing Justice Kennedy’s central role
in developing the animus idea).
46 See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (Kennedy opinion for five
Justices striking down Texas’s sodomy law on due process grounds but employing equal
protection-style reasoning when speaking of the “stigma” and harm to “dignity” a
sodomy conviction imposes on LGB persons).
47 See infra Section II.B.
48 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
49 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
50 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
51 Indeed, the Hawaii Court began its animus analysis with a citation and discussion
of the first three animus cases (Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer). See id. at 2420.
52 See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).
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In agreeing with the plaintiffs in both cases, the Court made liberal
use of equal protection concepts.53 In Lukumi, the Court ruled in favor
of a religious sect’s desire to conduct animal sacrifice rituals, concluding
that a city’s animal slaughter ordinances were neither neutral nor
generally applicable and thus fell outside of Smith’s rule essentially
abjuring any free exercise scrutiny.54 In concluding that the ordinance
failed the neutrality requirement, Justice Kennedy, joined in this part of
his opinion only by Justice Stevens, explicitly borrowed from the Court’s
equal protection discriminatory intent jurisprudence, employing the
factors the Court uses to identify such intent as set forth in the 1977 case
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corporation.55
A quarter-century later in Masterpiece, Justice Kennedy succeeded
in assembling a majority for similar borrowing.56 Masterpiece involved
a baker’s claim that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission violated his
free exercise rights when it refused to grant him a religion-based
exemption from the state’s public accommodations law after he refused
to sell a wedding cake to a same-sex couple. Just as in Lukumi, a decision
that the Commission’s action reflected a neutral application of the
state’s public accommodations statute would not carry the day for the
plaintiff’s free exercise claim. But again, as in Lukumi, the Court ruled
that the state actor—here, the Commission—had targeted religiously
motivated conduct for unfavorable treatment.
Writing for a six-Justice majority in Masterpiece, Justice Kennedy
concluded that statements made by one of the members of the
Commission reflected a negative view of the baker’s beliefs. On that
ground, the Court concluded that the full Commission had failed to give
“neutral and respectful”57 consideration to the baker’s religiously
motivated request for an exemption. The Court found “[a]nother
indication of hostility”58 to the baker’s beliefs in what Justice Kennedy
characterized as the Commission’s more favorable treatment of

53

Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lukumi made this explicit. See Lukumi, 508 U.S.
at 540 (“In determining if the object of a law is a neutral one under the Free Exercise
Clause, we can also find guidance in our equal protection cases. As Justice Harlan noted
in the related context of the Establishment Clause, ‘[n]eutrality in its application
requires an equal protection mode of analysis.’”) (citation omitted). This part of Justice
Kennedy’s opinion spoke only for himself and Justice Stevens. Id. at 522.
54 Instead, the Court applied strict scrutiny, which it concluded the ordinance failed.
Id. at 546.
55 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540–41 (Kennedy, J., joined by Stevens, J.).
56 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
57 Id. at 1729.
58 Id. at 1730.

ARAIZA (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

4/5/2021 4:55 PM

RESURRECTING ANIMUS

995

analogous exemption requests based on secular grounds.59 Citing his
opinion in Lukumi, but this time speaking for the Court, Justice Kennedy
again identified and applied the Arlington Heights factors in finding a
lack of neutrality in the Commission’s conduct.60
Strikingly, Justice Kennedy described the neutrality
requirement—which again, he applied using the Arlington Heights
factors—in terms suggesting not mere classification on the basis of
religion but rather as reflecting explicitly invidious conduct. He wrote:
In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, the Court made clear that the
government, if it is to respect the Constitution’s guarantee of
free exercise, cannot impose regulations that are hostile to the
religious beliefs of affected citizens and cannot act in a manner
that passes judgment upon or presupposes the illegitimacy of
religious beliefs and practices.61
He also cautioned that “The Constitution ‘commits government itself to
religious tolerance, and upon even slight suspicion that proposals for
state intervention stem from animosity to religion or distrust of its
practices, all officials must pause to remember their own high duty to
the Constitution and to the rights it secures.’”62 Thus, in Masterpiece,
Justice Kennedy wielded the tools provided by equal protection
discriminatory intent jurisprudence, but did so in support of a
conclusion of ultimate invidiousness rather than mere classification.
This reflects a slight but crucial shift in the direction in which the tools
point.63

59 Justice Thomas concurred in part and in the judgment, mainly in order to focus on
the baker’s free speech claim, which the Court did not address. While Justice Thomas
agreed with the Court’s free exercise conclusion, he seemed to base that conclusion on
the Commission’s actual disposition of the religious- and secular-based exemption
requests, rather than on the narrower ground of the particular commissioner’s
comments about religion. See id. at 1740 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment). Justice Gorsuch joined Justice Thomas’s opinion, and indeed in his
own concurrence he stressed the differences in the actual dispositions of the two
exemption requests. See id. at 1734, 1740 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). But he also joined
the majority opinion, thus indicating his agreement with the majority’s focus on the
commissioner’s comments as at least one, if not the only, source of the Commission’s
unconstitutional conduct. Id. at 1722. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor,
dissented. Id. at 1748.
60 Id. at 1731 (citing those factors and quoting Lukumi).
61 Id. at 1731 (emphasis added).
62 Id. at 1731 (emphasis added) (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993)).
63 See also Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540 (“That the ordinances were enacted ‘“because of,”
not merely “in spite of,”’ their suppression of Santeria religious practice, is revealed by
the events preceding their enactment.”) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
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Several weeks after Masterpiece, the Court again considered a
Religion Clause-based claim grounded in animus. But in this third
Religion Clause case implicating animus, Trump v. Hawaii, a five-Justice
majority rejected the plaintiffs’ claim.64 Hawaii upheld a revised
iteration of President Trump’s “Muslim ban” executive order
temporarily halting immigration from eight nations, most of which were
majority-Muslim.
The Court, speaking through Chief Justice Roberts, began its
rational basis discussion65 with a recitation of the first three cases of the
animus quadrilogy—Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer.66 The Court read
those cases as resting on conclusions that it was “impossible to discern
a relationship to legitimate state interests or that the policy [was]
inexplicable by anything but animus.”67 By contrast, the Court found a
rational connection between the challenged order and national security,
given the order’s facial neutrality vis-à-vis Muslims, the fact that the vast
majority of the world’s Muslims lived in nations not subject to the order,
the status of the affected nations as subjects of previous congressionally
imposed, security-based restrictions, the worldwide inter-agency
review that preceded the order, the removal of several nations from the
restrictions after the order was promulgated, and, finally, the order’s
exceptions and waiver provisions.68
To be sure, Hawaii did not cite Arlington Heights or explicitly
employ its factors. Still, it is worth noting the Court’s observations about
the order’s allegedly insignificant disparate impact on Muslims69 and
the procedural regularity of the government’s decision-making
process,70 as well as the Court’s engagement with the statements made
by candidate and then-President Trump regarding Muslims and Muslim

64

Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
The Court assumed, for purposes of deciding the case, that the national security
basis for the President’s decision did not preclude judicial review of the decision’s
rationality beyond whether the decision was “facially legitimate and bona fide.” Id.
at 2420.
66 Id. at 2420.
67 Id. at 2420–21 (internal quotations omitted).
68 See id. at 2421–23.
69 See id. at 2421 (“Plaintiffs and the dissent nonetheless emphasize that five of the
seven nations currently included in the Proclamation have Muslim-majority
populations. Yet that fact alone does not support an inference of religious hostility, given
that the policy covers just 8% of the world’s Muslim population and is limited to
countries that were previously designated by Congress or prior administrations as
posing national security risks.”).
70 Id. (“The Proclamation . . . reflects the results of a worldwide review process
undertaken by multiple Cabinet officials and their agencies.”).
65
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immigration.71 These considerations all reflect some of the Arlington
Heights factors.72 More generally, the opinion’s description of the order
as resting on a measured and deliberative decision-making process
hearkens back beyond Arlington Heights to the Court’s application, in
Washington v. Davis,73 of the intent requirement that it announced in
that case.74
C. DHS v. Regents
The cases described above provide the foundation for the Court’s
discussion of the plaintiffs’ animus claim in Regents. In at least two of
the three cases consolidated in Regents, the plaintiffs alleged that the
rescission of DACA was based on “animus” or “discriminatory animus.”75
The two district courts that considered those claims76 proceeded by
applying the Arlington Heights factors, concluding that they sufficiently
established the plausibility of the plaintiffs’ claims to defeat the
government’s motion to dismiss.77
71 See id. at 2418 (“Plaintiffs argue that this President’s words strike at fundamental
standards of respect and tolerance, in violation of our constitutional tradition. But the
issue before us is not whether to denounce the statements. It is instead the significance
of those statements in reviewing a Presidential directive, neutral on its face, addressing
a matter within the core of executive responsibility. In doing so, we must consider not
only the statements of a particular President, but also the authority of the Presidency
itself.”) (emphasis added).
72 See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267–68
(1977) (specifying the factors relevant to discriminatory intent, including the degree of
disparate impact, the procedural regularity of the decision, and any statements directly
suggesting discriminatory intent).
73 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
74 For a further explanation of how Davis’s application of the intent requirement
established the framework for the Arlington Heights factors, see ARAIZA, supra note 11
at 149–50.
75 See Third Amended Complaint, Vidal v. Nielsen (No. 16-4756), 2017 WL
10088221 (Dec. 11, 2017 E.D.N.Y); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief,
Garcia v. United States (No. 17-5380), 2017 WL 4157508 (Sept. 18, 2017 N.D.Cal.). The
complaints in the consolidated litigation conducted in the District Court for the District
of Columbia may not have used the actual term “animus.” See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Opposition
to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, NAACP v. Trump (No. 17-2325), 2017 WL 9728575
(Dec. 15, 2017 D.D.C.) (referring to “equal protection” but not “animus” in their
argument against dismissal of the equal protection claim). It was in this litigation that
the district court chose to defer the equal protection issue, thus precluding any more
specificity about how that court understood the claim. See NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp.
3d 209, 246 (D.D.C. 2018).
76 One court deferred consideration of the plaintiffs’ equal protection claims. See
infra note 98.
77 See Vidal v. Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d 260, 279 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 298 F. Supp. 3d 1304 (N.D. Cal. 2018); see
also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476,
518–20 (9th Cir. 2018) (affirming the lower court’s decision on that point). In doing so,
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In Regents, a plurality of the Court adopted that approach and
analyzed that claim by explicit reference to Arlington Heights, writing
that “[t]o plead animus, a plaintiff must raise a plausible inference that
an ‘invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor’ in the
relevant decision.”78 After citing three of the Arlington Heights factors
(“disparate impact on a particular group, ‘[d]epartures from the normal
procedural sequence,’ and ‘contemporary statements by members of
the decisionmaking body’”79), the Court methodically but quickly
disposed of them,80 finding the plaintiffs’ allegations insufficient to plead
an animus claim. Justice Sotomayor dissented on the Court’s application
of those factors but did not disagree with their relevance. The remaining
four Justices concurred in the result rejecting the plaintiffs’ animus
claim, but without saying anything more about it.81
The Regents plurality’s treatment of the animus issue—and just as
much, the bare statements of the four-Justice bloc agreeing with the
plurality’s rejection of that claim—might suggest, in the words of one
prominent commentator, “trouble for discrimination law.”82 Perhaps.
But perhaps not. As the rest of this Article argues, while a decision for
the plaintiffs would certainly have been more helpful to equality
plaintiffs, Regents might have a silver lining. To be sure, however, that
silver lining comes with a caution.83

those district courts followed other lower court decisions that had employed the
Arlington Heights factors in the context of an animus claim. See infra note 87 (noting the
frequency of lower court use of the Arlington Heights factors in similar contexts).
78 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1915 (2020)
(quoting Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).
79 Id. (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266–68).
80 See, e.g., Fifth Amendment—Due Process Clause—Equal Protection—Department
of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California, 134 HARV. L. REV. 510,
519 (2020) [hereinafter Fifth Amendment] (characterizing the Court’s dismissal of the
plaintiffs’ animus claim as “hasty”).
81 See supra note 3 (setting forth and citing the opinions of the Justices who did not
join the plurality’s discussion of the animus issue).
82 See Jessica Clarke, The DACA Decision is Trouble for Discrimination Law, TAKE CARE
BLOG (June 24, 2020), https://takecareblog.com/blog/the-daca-decision-is-trouble-fordiscrimination-law; see also Fifth Amendment, supra note 80, at 519 (expressing concern
that the Court’s “hasty dismissal” of the Regents’ plaintiffs animus claim at the pleading
stage “may therefore make claims of discrimination by the government even harder to
prove.”).
83 See infra Part V (discussing these implications).
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III. THE SURVIVAL OF ANIMUS
The first striking feature of Regents’ treatment of animus is that the
Court broached the issue at all. But before we can understand the
significance of that decision, we need to unpack the concept of animus.
In particular, understanding the importance of animus’s survival
requires that we appreciate, at least tentatively, its relationship to
discriminatory intent.
A. Animus and Intent: A First Cut84
The concept of animus, and invidiousness more generally, has a
tangled relationship with the idea of discriminatory intent.85 The
plaintiffs in the DACA cases alleged that the government had acted with
“discriminatory animus.”86 This locution is not unusual; reported cases
often refer to equal protection claims using that term.87 But its meaning
is cloudy.88 If the term means only that the plaintiffs had alleged that
the government acted with discriminatory intent, such claims would
simply constitute garden variety arguments that facially neutral
government actions were tainted with an intent to classify on the
alleged ground. On this reasoning, the addition of “animus” to the claim
84 The relationship between animus and intent is reprised later in this Article. See
infra Part IV.
85 See generally Aziz Huq, What Is Discriminatory Intent?, 103 CORN. L. REV. 1211
(2018) (exploring this relationship).
86 See Vidal v. Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d 260, 269 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (setting forth the
plaintiffs’ allegations); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. United States Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (citing the plaintiffs’ allegations).
87 A Westlaw search in the “All Federal” database for “equal protection” within the
same paragraph as “discriminatory animus,” limited to opinions handed down since
2000, yielded 2,969 hits. To be sure, some of these cases likely involve statutory causes
of action that have some connection to equal protection. See, e.g., Griffin v. Breckenridge,
403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971) (construing 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) as requiring that the plaintiff
show some type of “discriminatory animus”). Nevertheless, the large number suggests
that core equal protection claims are often stated using this terminology. See, e.g., Equity
in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 639 F.3d 91, 108 (4th Cir. 2011) (“In order to survive
a motion to dismiss an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to
demonstrate plausibly that he was treated differently from others who were similarly
situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of discriminatory animus.”). As
an illustration of the tangled relationship between animus and intent, the Equity in
Athletics court referred to the “discriminatory animus” requirement as the “intent”
requirement. See id. As support for the proposition quoted above, that court cited
another case that simply referred to the requirement of “intentional or purposeful
discrimination.” See id. (citing Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001)
(requiring that an equal protection plaintiff allege “intentional or purposeful
discrimination”)).
88 See Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme
Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 288 (1997) (arguing that scholars often “misconstrue”
the Court’s doctrine on this point).
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carries no independent legal significance and adds nothing to the
straightforward allegation of discriminatory intent.89
But “animus” can mean more. As Section II.A sets forth, “animus”
has come to identify a specific subset of equal protection cases in which
a “bare . . . desire to harm”90 a particular group constitutes a sufficient
reason to strike down a law as violating equal protection. In light of that
doctrinal evolution, an allegation of “discriminatory animus” should be
understood, at least in some cases, as something different than an
allegation of “discriminatory intent.” If it were otherwise—that is, if
“animus” and “intent” were the same concept—then there would be no
point in applying the relevant scrutiny level (say, intermediate scrutiny)
after concluding that a facially neutral law intentionally classifies on the
relevant basis (say, on the basis of sex). To put the matter slightly
differently, if “intent” necessarily means “animus,” and if animus is a
constitutional wrong,91 then the intent finding is logically and
necessarily fatal to a law without the need to apply a given level of
scrutiny.
Of course, this is not the law. Rather, hornbook law calls for
“intentional” sex classifications to face intermediate scrutiny and
“intentional” race classifications to face strict scrutiny. Indeed, this rule
reflects not just hornbook law but logic: if a facially explicit race
classification (say, a race-based affirmative action program) is not
struck down but instead triggers strict scrutiny that the Court insists is
not necessarily fatal,92 then why should a facially neutral but intentional
race classification be subject to automatic invalidation? For purposes of
equal protection law today, these two types of race classifications are
treated the same.93 Most notably for our purposes, they both get a final
chance to survive by prevailing after application of the relevant scrutiny
level.
Thus, if “animus” truly is different from “intent,” then
“discriminatory animus” must also be different from “discriminatory
intent.” The plurality in Regents seemed to understand this. It began its
89

See id. (noting this superfluity).
United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
91 See, e.g., Pollvogt, supra note 11, at 889 (“when animus is found, it functions as a
doctrinal silver bullet”).
92 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (“Strict scrutiny is not ‘strict
in theory, but fatal in fact.’”); id. at 343–44 (upholding an affirmative action university
admissions program that was conceded to consider race among other diversity factors);
Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (upholding a facial sex classification).
93 See George Rutherglen, Discrimination and Its Discontents, 81 VA. L. REV. 117, 125
(1995) (“If anything plainly falls under the description of intentional discrimination, it
is affirmative action.”).
90
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review of the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim as follows: “To plead
animus, a plaintiff must raise a plausible inference that an invidious
discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the relevant
decision.”94 It concluded its equal protection analysis on the same note:
“Thus, like respondents’ other points, the [President’s anti-Latino]
statements fail to raise a plausible inference that the rescission was
motivated by animus.”95 Thus, the plurality’s analysis did not identify its
task as the ferreting out of an intent to classify against Latinos, and its
conclusion, while susceptible to such a characterization, is more
naturally read as a statement about something more than mere
classificatory intent.96
B. The Significance of the Survival of Animus Doctrine
Now that we understand that there is a difference between animus
and our hornbook understanding of intent (even if we are not yet sure
exactly what that difference is),97 we can appreciate the significance of
Regents’ engagement with the former. That engagement was striking
for its willfulness. While two of the three lower court opinions reviewed
in Regents addressed the animus argument,98 a Supreme Court decision
on that issue was unnecessary to the Court’s ultimate decision reversing
the DACA rescission, which rested on administrative law principles of
reasoned decision-making. Further, the administrative law basis for the
Court’s result raised the prospect of permanently mooting the plaintiffs’

94 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1915 (2020)
(emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
95 Id. at 1916 (emphasis added).
96 To be sure, a conclusion about animus necessarily incorporates within it a
conclusion about an intent to classify: surely, logic dictates that one cannot be guilty of
acting with animus toward a person or group while being innocent of an intent to single
that group out or classify based on its relevant characteristic. But the opposite does not
hold true; one may be guilty of classificatory intent without being guilty of animus. See
Selmi, supra note 88, at 288 (“Proving that a defendant acted with animus or an illicit
motive will generally suffice to establish intent to discriminate, however, neither animus
nor motive is required to prove intent.”) (emphasis in original); see also Richmond v. J.
A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion) (“the purpose of strict
scrutiny [of race classifications] is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring
that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly
suspect tool”).
97 See infra Section IV.B.2 (clarifying the relationship between these two concepts).
98 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 298 F.
Supp. 3d 1304, 1315 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Vidal v. Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d 260, 279 (E.D.N.Y.
2018); see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908
F.3d 476, 518–20 (9th Cir. 2018) (affirming the district court on the animus pleading
issue). But see NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 246 (D.D.C. 2018) (deferring a
ruling on the equal protection issue).
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equal protection claim.99 Indeed, reaching the animus issue required
the Court to brush past a preliminary question of how to characterize
the plaintiffs’ claim, which again might have allowed the Court to ignore
the animus issue.100
Yet the Regents Court reached the question. To be sure, one could
interpret its decision to do so as reflecting a desire conclusively to inter
the doctrine by imposing near-impossible requirements for animus
claimants to satisfy. But that hypothesis collides with the facts: three of
the then-four liberals joined the Chief Justice’s approach (and even
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent adopted the same approach as the plurality,

99 While ignoring the lower courts’ rulings in favor of the plaintiffs’ animus claims
would have left those claims available to be litigated, the reversal of the Administration’s
rescission decision on administrative law grounds meant that there was no longer a
decision to challenge on animus grounds. Of course, if the Administration responded by
reiterating its rescission, if that rescission was not reversed by a new presidential
administration, and if that future decision satisfied the administrative law requirements
of reasoned decision-making, then the animus claims would have been ripe. But this is
a highly speculative chain of events. The election of Vice President Joe Biden to the
presidency makes it quite likely that no recission will be in force after January 20, 2021.
(Indeed, on his first day in office, President Biden directed his Secretary of Homeland
Security to “take all actions he deems appropriate . . . to preserve and fortify DACA”.)
Office of the President, Memorandum for the Attorney General and the Secretary of
Homeland Security, Preserving and Fortifying Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(DACA) (January 20, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidentialactions/2021/01/20/preserving-and-fortifying-deferred-action-for-childhoodarrivals-daca. But even in June 2020, when the Court decided Regents, the chain of
events noted above was still quite speculative. But see Michael D. Shear & Emily
Cochrane, Trump Says Administration Will Try Again to End ‘Dreamers’ Program, N.Y.
TIMES (June 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/19/us/politics/trumpdaca.html (reporting that the Administration will try again, after Regents, to rescind the
DACA program). On the other hand, the Trump Administration’s unusually poor record
of prevailing in legal challenges to its regulatory initiatives should have suggested that
any renewal of the rescission effort might well again fail on administrative law grounds.
See, e.g., Institute for Policy Integrity, Roundup: Trump-Era Agency Policy in the Courts,
https://policyintegrity.org/trump-court-roundup (updated Apr. 5, 2021) (noting that
the Administration experienced a success rate of around 20% when defending its
regulatory initiatives in court). Regardless of these multiple layers of speculation
characterizing the situation the Regents Court confronted, it is notable that the district
court in the one case that did not reach the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim deferred its
decision on that claim exactly because it had ruled for the plaintiffs on the administrative
law point. See NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 246 (D.D.C. 2018). Moreover, that
court observed that its administrative law decision “could . . . alter DACA’s rescission in
ways that might affect the merits of plaintiffs’ constitutional claims.” Id. Thus, the Court
had before it an analysis that clearly established how speculative an animus ruling
would be.
100 See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1915
(2020) (assuming, for purposes of deciding the animus issue, that the plaintiffs were not
stating a selective enforcement claim, which under Supreme Court precedent could not
be raised by an alien).
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differing only in her application101), while the four conservatives
contented themselves with barren agreements with the result that
remained silent on the merits of that approach.102
Without access to the Justices’ records—and even with them—it is
impossible to know with certainty their motivations for reaching out to
decide certain issues in certain ways.103 At any rate, as Mark Tushnet
reminds us, knowledge of those motivations adds little to our
understanding of the law itself—instead, what matters is what is in the
opinions.104 Thus, the reasons the Chief Justice and his colleagues may
have had for reaching out to decide the animus question matter less than
the bare fact that they decided it and the details of their analysis.
Consider that decision to engage the animus issue. The Regents
Court’s engagement with the animus concept suggests a renewed
legitimacy for animus arguments. One might have been forgiven for
expecting the animus idea to wither in the Supreme Court—and thus
eventually in the lower courts—after Justice Kennedy’s retirement.
Justice Kennedy wrote Romer and Windsor, as well as the two free
exercise opinions that imported animus-style reasoning into the Free
Exercise Clause. More generally, he was the Justice most closely
associated with the concept of animus,105 and his status as the swing
Justice on a closely divided Court gave his doctrinal preferences an
101 Of course, as scholars have noted, in equality law, the Court’s application of the
relevant standard is at least as important as the standard itself. See, e.g., Selmi, supra
note 88, at 334 (1997) (“[W]hen the Court engages in the ‘sensitive inquiry’ of
circumstantial proof mandated by Arlington Heights, it invariably fails to find intentional
discrimination and upholds the challenged governmental practice”). Nevertheless, as
this Article explains, the Court’s preservation of the animus doctrine is in fact a
significant development.
102 See Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1918 (Thomas, J., joined by Alito and Gorsuch, JJ.,
dissenting); id. at 1932 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
103 A reporter has suggested that there was little serious negotiation over the DACA
decision, and that the three liberal Justices who joined all of the Chief Justice’s opinion
acted quickly, apparently not raising any serious concerns about the animus part of his
opinion. See Joan Biskupic, Behind Closed Doors During One of John Roberts’ Most
Surprising Years on the Supreme Court, CNN (July 27, 2020, 4:28 PM)
https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/27/politics/john-roberts-supreme-court-liberalsdaca-second-amendment/index.html.
104 See Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court and Race Discrimination, 1967–1991: The
View From the Marshall Papers, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473, 473 (1995) (“Lawyers and
historians agree that almost everything we need to know about constitutional law is
found in the Supreme Court’s published opinions. Internal Court documents . . . tell us
something about the dynamics within the Court but relatively little about constitutional
law.”).
105 See, e.g., Melissa Murray, Inverting Animus: Masterpiece Cakeshop and the New
Minorities, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 257, 266 (“[Justice] Kennedy, in his tenure on the Court,
has done more than any modern Justice to advance the doctrine of animus in the Court’s
equal protection jurisprudence.”).
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outsized influence. His departure in 2018 left many observers
wondering about the fate of the concept he had urged throughout his
tenure on the Court.106
The Court’s decision to reach the animus issue places the
post-Kennedy Court on record as recognizing that sort of equal
protection claim. Rather than ignoring it, acknowledging but dismissing
or deferring it, or transmuting it into a straightforward question of
discriminatory intent, the Court instead legitimized the claim by both
engaging it and providing a doctrinal structure for analyzing such
claims. The Court’s treatment of that issue sends a clear signal to lower
courts, not just setting forth how to analyze animus claims but directing
that such claims should be analyzed rather than simply rejected out of
hand. That fact may have the effect of solidifying the status of animus as
a tool in a would-be plaintiff’s litigation toolbox.
Nor does the plurality’s rejection of the animus argument
necessarily weaken the force of future claims of that sort. Regents’
application of the Arlington Heights factors it considered relevant in that
particular case—the extent of the disparate impact, any alleged
procedural irregularities, and statements made by the relevant
officials—was cursory, hardly the stuff of an emphatic rejection
reverberating beyond the particular facts of the case in front of the
Court.107 The plurality opinion provided no suggestion that the animus
inquiry required particularly compelling evidence. Indeed, it offered
nothing to distinguish animus analysis from the “sensitive inquiry into
such circumstantial and direct evidence . . . as may be available”108 that
is required by the discriminatory intent analysis to which the Court
closely tied its analysis of the animus issue. Moreover, it is worth
remembering that discriminatory intent conclusions are considered
factual, rather than legal, conclusions, suggesting that trial courts have
primary responsibility for making such findings.109 To the extent the
Court’s analysis in Regents connected the concepts of discriminatory
intent and animus, it presumably transferred from the former into the
latter context the factual nature of the relevant conclusion (and thus
106 See, e.g., Brendan Beery, Rational Basis Loses Its Bite: Justice Kennedy’s Retirement
Removes the Most Lethal Quill from LGBT Advocates’ Equal Protection Quiver, 69 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 69 (2019) (suggesting that the Court’s tendency to use the animus concept in gay
rights cases is less secure after Justice Kennedy’s retirement); see also William D. Araiza,
Animus and Its Discontents, 71 FLA. L. REV. 155, 216 (2019) [hereinafter Discontents]
(raising this same possibility).
107 See Fifth Amendment, supra note 80, at 519 (describing the Court’s rejection of the
animus claim as “hasty”).
108 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
109 See Rodgers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 623 (1982).
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trial courts’ primary responsibility for such inquiries) and, more
generally, the “sensitiv[ity]” of the relevant inquiry.110 This is hardly a
directive to lower courts to smother such claims in the crib.
The apparent survival of animus doctrine signals to litigants and
lower courts that such claims should receive serious consideration.
Chief Justice Roberts had options had he wished to use Regents as an
opportunity to tamp down such litigation. For example, he could have
characterized animus claims as resting on allegations of bad subjective
motivations on the part of government decision-makers and thus
warned against over-aggressive use of that theory.111 Alternatively, the
Chief Justice could have cited his own language in Trump v. Hawaii for
the proposition that an animus conclusion requires that “[i]t . . . be said
that it is impossible to ‘discern a relationship [between the challenged
action and] legitimate state interests’ or that the [government] policy is
‘inexplicable by anything but animus.’”112 It is possible that any such
skeptical analysis would have won the support of his conservative
colleagues, given their previous skepticism about animus arguments,113
and thus allowed him to rely on that bloc of judges for a majority
decision on the animus question.
Or perhaps not. Recall that a recent prior use of animus-type
reasoning occurred in a religious liberty case, Masterpiece Cakeshop v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission,114 where that idea was deployed in
support of a religion-based claim for an exemption from a public
accommodations statute.115 Given the relatively inhospitable doctrinal
110

Concededly, scholars have argued that, despite its description of the intent inquiry
as a “sensitive” one, the Court has been notably unenthusiastic about finding
discriminatory intent as a result of that inquiry. See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 88 at 334
(citing “[t]he Court’s reluctance to draw inferences of discrimination . . . when the Court
engages in the ‘sensitive inquiry’ . . . mandated by Arlington Heights”). Still, the factual
nature of a discriminatory intent (and presumably, now, an animus) conclusion suggests
that lower courts and in particular district courts, rather than the Supreme Court, will
have primary authority for animus inquiries going forward. For a careful study of the
success of claims alleging intentional government discrimination, see Theodore
Eisenberg and Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal
Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151 (1991).
111 Cf. Dept. of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573–74 (2019) (stating that
courts should probe the mental processes of decision-makers only in rare
circumstances).
112 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420 (2018) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 632, 635 (1996)).
113 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 778, 797–98 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
joined by Thomas, J., dissenting).
114 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
115 See id. at 1729 (“The neutral and respectful consideration to which Phillips was
entitled was compromised here, however. The Civil Rights Commission’s treatment of
his case has some elements of a clear and impermissible hostility toward the sincere
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terrain governing Free Exercise Clause claims,116 it might well be that
those conservative Justices—and Chief Justice Roberts himself—remain
interested in preserving a role for animus more generally in order to
preserve its utility in Free Exercise Clause cases where plaintiffs
otherwise face a steep uphill climb.117 Perhaps the conservative
Justices’ residual interest in an animus theory explains their failure to
offer a more emphatic rejection of the plaintiffs’ animus claim in
Regents.118
Conceding the speculative nature of such explanations, and their
limited value for understanding legal doctrine,119 this possibility would
explain both the Chief Justice’s engagement with the animus argument
when it was unnecessary to do so and the terse concurrences in the
judgment on that issue from the then-four conservatives.120 Those bare
statements of agreement with the result allow Justices Thomas, Alito,
Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh to deploy animus reasoning in future contexts,
unencumbered by any limitations one might be able to glean from the
Chief Justice’s analysis in his plurality opinion. But regardless of their
motivations, their actions in Regents created a situation in which Chief
Justice Roberts’ opinion accomplished little except to keep animus open
as a doctrinal path, should that bloc of Justices wish to embark on it.121
religious beliefs that motivated his objection [to the application of the public
accommodations law to him].”).
116 See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (declining to engage in meaningful
scrutiny of generally applicable laws that impose incidental burdens on religiously
motivated conduct).
117 See, e.g., Mark Satta, Unclear Hostility: Supreme Court Discussions of ‘Hostility to
Religion’ from Barnette to American Legion, 68 BUFF. L. REV. 641, 671 (2020)
(“[C]onservatives may be more apt to perceive animus on the part of those whose
actions inhibit or disfavor religion (along with being more apt to see actions as inhibiting
or disfavoring religion to begin with) than liberals”). To be sure, Professor Satta may
not be using “animus” in its strict doctrinal sense. See id. at 647 (providing a dictionary
definition of “animus” and discussing its common, rather than doctrinal, meaning).
Nevertheless, the point remains that an animus theory may remain attractive to
conservative Justices who may be more prone to discern hostility to religion in
government actions.
118 See discussion supra note 3.
119 See supra text accompanying notes 103–04.
120 See discussion supra note 3.
121 Indeed, this possibility may also explain the actions of Justices Breyer, Ginsburg,
and Kagan in signing onto the Chief’s plurality discussion of animus. Perhaps their
desire to create a majority (when combined with Justice Sotomayor’s dissent) for a
willingness to apply animus analysis was enough to allow themselves to sign on to his
opinion rejecting the plaintiffs’ animus claims, especially since the Court had already
ruled in favor of the DACA plaintiffs on the administrative law ground. On this (once
again, highly speculative) point, it might be helpful to recall the reporting suggesting
that the three liberals quickly and without major comment signed on to the Chief
Justice’s draft opinion in Regents. See supra note 103. Perhaps those Justices wished to
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Whatever the underlying reasons, Regents’ response to the
plaintiffs’ animus argument allows that theory to live another day.
Given speculation that Justice Kennedy’s retirement would halt the
further evolution of that idea,122 this development from Regents is
worthy of note.
But what about the terms of that survival? Regents is worthy of
note also because it explicitly connected equal protection animus to the
Court’s preexisting structure for uncovering discriminatory intent.123
Part IV examines the details of that connection before Part V considers
its implications.
IV. ANIMUS, DISCRIMINATORY INTENT, AND THE RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES OF
THEIR CONNECTION
A. The Roundabout Return to Arlington Heights
The survival of animus makes possible new explorations of that
concept’s meaning. Beyond rescuing the animus concept from the
constitutional law discard pile, the Chief Justice’s plurality opinion in
Regents accomplished a roundabout evolution in the methodology for
identifying animus. That evolution began in the first two Free Exercise
Clause cases discussed earlier, Lukumi124 and, a quarter-century later,
Masterpiece.125 In those cases, Justice Kennedy, initially writing only for
two Justices and then in Masterpiece for a majority, borrowed the
Arlington Heights discriminatory intent factors from equal protection
law as tools for identifying the targeting of religion that, even after
Smith, presumptively violates the Free Exercise Clause.
While the Court’s earlier equal protection animus cases had
employed considerations analogous to the Arlington Heights factors
when determining whether animus was lurking,126 Justice Kennedy’s
free exercise analysis in Lukumi was the first to explicitly cite Arlington
Heights for that connection.127 One could understand that as a
lock in the stability of the Court’s incipient majority rejecting DACA’s rescission on
administrative law grounds and saw his rejection of the animus argument as not so
decisive as to deprive the animus theory of any future usefulness.
122 See supra note 106.
123 Recall that this connection had already been made in religious freedom cases. See
supra Section II.B (explaining that connection in those cases).
124 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
125 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
See supra Section II.B (discussing these two cases).
126 See ARAIZA, supra note 11 at 137–38 (explaining those cases as implicitly applying
the Arlington Heights factors).
127 See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540.
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seemingly minor move. His inquiry in Lukumi sought to determine
whether the city’s animal slaughtering ordinance was a neutral one, as
post-Smith Free Exercise Clause doctrine demanded, or instead whether
it was targeted at religion.128 That anti-discrimination inquiry is easily
analogized to an equal protection inquiry into whether a challenged
government action intentionally targeted a group based on a suspect
classification, such as race or gender.129
By Masterpiece, however, the inquiry had shifted, subtly but
meaningfully.
In Masterpiece, Justice Kennedy described the
government’s duty under the Free Exercise Clause as not only to
demonstrate neutrality toward religion but to refrain from “impos[ing]
regulations that are hostile to the religious beliefs of affected citizens”130
or from “act[ing] in a manner that passes judgment upon or
presupposes the illegitimacy of religious beliefs and practices,”131 and to
avoid “proposals for state intervention [that] stem from animosity to
religion or distrust of its practices.”132 No longer content with simply
exposing government action that treated religion differently—that is, an
action that classified based on religion—in Masterpiece, Justice Kennedy
employed the Arlington Heights factors to expose government action
that was taken with intent we would describe as invidious: reflecting
“hostil[ity]” to religious beliefs, “pass[ing] judgment” on religion,
“presuppos[ing] [its] illegitimacy,” and reflecting “animosity to religion

128

See id. at 531–32.
See Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J. concurring)
(stating, in the context of an Establishment Clause case, that “[n]eutrality in [the]
application [of a challenged statute] requires an equal protection mode of analysis.”);
see also Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540 (“In determining if the object of a law is a neutral one
under the Free Exercise Clause, we can also find guidance in our equal protection
cases.”); id. (citing Justice Harlan’s statement in Walz). Compare Lukumi, 508 U.S.
at 540–42 (plurality opinion) (discussing neutrality with reference to the Arlington
Heights factors), with Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266–68 (1977) (setting forth those factors).
130 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1731
(2018).
131 Id.
132 Id. (quoting Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 547).
129
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or distrust of its practices.”133 Thus, by Masterpiece, the Court134 had
gone on record as relying on the Arlington Heights factors, not just for
identifying the bare fact of classification or “discrimination” but also for
the related but further inquiry into whether the challenged government
action reflected bad ultimate government intent—what we call
animus.135
Lukumi and Masterpiece were, of course, Free Exercise Clause
cases. Regents then transplanted that Free Exercise Clause doctrine,
which had originated in equal protection doctrine, back into its original
equal protection soil. To be sure, Regents did not cite those free exercise
cases. This is hardly surprising; Arlington Heights is an equal protection
case, and it would be odd to cite free exercise cases as authority for how
to apply an equal protection case (Arlington Heights) to decide an equal
protection claim.136 Nevertheless, Chief Justice Roberts’ deployment of
the Arlington Heights factors as part of an equal protection animus
inquiry follows Justice Kennedy’s deployment of those factors, to the
133 See id. To be sure, Lukumi also features language which hints at this inquiry into
invidiousness rather than simply anti-classification. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540 (“That
the ordinances were enacted ‘“because of,” not merely “in spite of,”’ their suppression of
Santeria religious practice is revealed by the events preceding their enactment.”)
(internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, Lukumi’s subsequent
application of strict scrutiny to the challenged city ordinances suggests that the Court’s
conclusion about those laws’ discrimination did not rise to the level of a finding of
invidiousness. By contrast, the Court’s conclusion in Masterpiece about the state’s
treatment of the baker’s religious motivations did in fact reflect such a finding. More
generally, much of the tone of the discrimination/classification analysis in Masterpiece
focused on the invidiousness issue, while Lukumi focused more heavily on whether the
challenged ordinances were in fact neutral and generally applicable, or alternatively,
whether they singled out religion.
134 Unlike his use of the Arlington Heights factors in Lukumi, his use of those factors
in Masterpiece spoke for a majority.
135 Indeed, the parallel between how these free exercise cases thought about bad
government intent and their equal protection analogues goes further. In Lukumi, the
Court, after finding the law to have singled out religious exercise, applied strict scrutiny,
much as a court in a standard equal protection case would do after finding the requisite
intent to classify. See 508 U.S. at 546 (“A law burdening religious practice that is not
neutral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny. To
satisfy the commands of the First Amendment, a law restrictive of religious practice
must advance interests of the highest order and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of
those interests.”) (internal quotations omitted). By contrast, in Masterpiece, the Court’s
finding of bad government intent itself constituted the free exercise violation, in a
manner similar to the animus cases. See 138 S. Ct. at 1732 (“The official expressions of
hostility to religion in some of the commissioners’ comments . . . were inconsistent with
what the Free Exercise Clause requires. The Commission’s disparate consideration of
Phillips’ case compared to the cases of the other bakers suggests the same. For these
reasons, the order must be set aside.”).
136 Indeed, a Westlaw search of the briefs in Regents reveals no citations at all to
either Lukumi or Masterpiece.
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same end, in the free exercise context. Regardless of whether the Chief
Justice considered those free exercise cases as binding precedent for his
use of Arlington Heights or as mere guideposts, or whether he
considered them at all, his use of the Arlington Heights factors parallels
Justice Kennedy’s use in those cases.
In sum, the Arlington Heights factors Justice Kennedy borrowed137
and transformed in the free exercise context were lent back, in their
transformed version, in Regents. That reborrowing carries with it
important possibilities for equal protection law—some positive and
some potentially problematic. The next section sketches out the
theoretical foundation for those possibilities. Part V examines
on-the-ground implications.
B. Reopening Equal Protection Law
1. The Current Closed System
The discriminatory intent requirement announced one year before
Arlington Heights in Washington v. Davis138 has been heavily criticized
for its deadening effect on equal protection doctrine. Critics have
argued that the intent requirement is difficult to satisfy,139 thus placing
a significant roadblock in the path of civil rights plaintiffs, and reflects a
mistakenly limited understanding of discrimination.140 They have also
noted the irony that, because that requirement stands in the way of
plaintiffs only when alleged racial discrimination is not explicit on the
face of the government action, it raises this hurdle mainly in cases
involving minority plaintiffs, since white plaintiffs’ equal protection
claims usually involve challenges to explicit race classifications such as
set-aside and other affirmative action programs.141
137 For a more general discussion of constitutional borrowing, see Nelson Tebbe &
Robert Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459 (2010).
138 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
139 See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 701, 703 (2006) [hereinafter Mistake] (“Liberal academics have denounced [Davis]
as unjustifiably limiting the scope of the Equal Protection Clause . . . .”).
140 See, e.g., Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV.
1049 (1978) (arguing that the intent requirement reflects a limited,
perpetrator-focused, perspective on discrimination); Charles Lawrence III, The Id, the
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317
(1987) (arguing that the intent requirement betrays a basic misunderstanding of human
decision-making).
141 For a statement and explanation of the basic rules of laid out above, see Selmi,
supra note 88 at 290 (“The [Supreme] Court’s intentional discrimination cases can be
divided into two familiar categories: those that involve facially discriminatory
classifications and those that are facially neutral. For facially discriminatory practices
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It did not have to be so. Professor Ian Haney-Lopez has explained
that in the period immediately after Davis the Court embraced a more
holistic understanding of the concept of discriminatory intent.142 That
concept focused less on identifying instances of mere government
classification and more on identifying invidious discrimination. For
example, Professor Haney-Lopez emphasizes a 1977 case, United Jewish
Organizations of Williamsburgh v. Carey (“UJO”).143 In that case, the
Court made clear that what it was looking for was not simply
“discrimination” in the sense of classification but rather what a
concurring Justice called “invidious” discrimination.144
In UJO, the Court upheld a New York legislative gerrymander that
was designed to increase minority political power beyond that in a
previous redistricting proposal that had failed Department of Justice
preclearance review under the Voting Rights Act.145 The Justices fully
recognized that the state had enacted the challenged gerrymander with
a racial purpose.146 Nevertheless, the Court upheld the government’s
action against a Fourteenth Amendment challenge. Writing at that point
for three Justices, Justice White concluded that the challenged law

and policies, the element of intent is inferred from the language, and the Court engages
in no additional inquiry to determine whether the statute or policy was
discriminatory. . . . These cases, however, . . . are now generally confined to either the
race-based affirmative action context or to gender-specific practices. . . . More
commonly, statutes and policies challenged as discriminatory are facially neutral, and
the court must infer intent from the fact of differential treatment.”). For an examination
of the irony noted in the text, see, e.g., Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer
Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111
(1997); see also id. at 1141 (“In the very same era that the Court adopted the highly
deferential Davis/Feeney framework, it began steadily to increase its scrutiny of
affirmative action policies—recently subjecting such policies to strict scrutiny.
Considered together, these two bodies of law create an interesting study in contrasts.
When plaintiffs challenge facially neutral policies that have a disparate impact on
minorities or women, the Court adopts a highly deferential stance towards a
legislature’s judgments. But when white plaintiffs challenge affirmative action policies
that increase the institutional representation of minority groups, the Court has, with
increasing insistence, warned that it will review and restrict the ambit of legislative
action.”). Katie Eyer has explained how the changing character of race discrimination
claims reaching the Court transformed the ideological and policy valence of the intent
requirement. See Katie Eyer, Ideological Drift and the Forgotten History of Intent, 51
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2016).
142 Ian Haney-Lopez, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1816 (2012)
(observing that cases decided a year after Davis reflected a “contextual” approach to
equal protection).
143 United Jewish Orgs., Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
144 Id. at 179–80 (Stewart, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
145 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.
146 See UJO, 430 U.S. at 165 (“There is no doubt that in preparing the 1974 legislation
the State deliberately used race in a purposeful manner.”).
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“represented no racial slur or stigma”147 on whites or members of any
other race. Writing for himself and Justice Powell, Justice Stewart was
even more explicit in applying a nuanced understanding of
discriminatory intent. He posed the question as “whether New York’s
use of racial criteria in redistricting Kings County violated the
Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment.”148 One would think that, however
he answered that question, his assumption that New York had “use[d]
. . . racial criteria”149 meant that the intent requirement from Davis was
satisfied and that the State’s action would confront the level of scrutiny
appropriate for intentional race discrimination. But it did not. Instead,
Justice Stewart wrote as follows:
Under the Fourteenth Amendment the question is whether
the
reapportionment
plan
represents
purposeful
discrimination against white voters. Washington v. Davis.
Disproportionate impact may afford some evidence that an
invidious purpose was present.
Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. But the record here does not
support a finding that the redistricting plan undervalued the
political power of white voters relative to their numbers in
Kings County . . . . That the legislature was aware of race when
it drew the district lines might also suggest a discriminatory
purpose. Such awareness is not, however, the equivalent of
discriminatory intent. The clear purpose with which the New
York Legislature acted—in response to the position of the
United States Department of Justice under the Voting Rights
Act—forecloses any finding that it acted with the invidious
purpose of discriminating against white voters.150
In other words, Justice Stewart, using criteria that either had been151 (or
soon would be152) acknowledged as relevant to the discriminatory
intent inquiry, found no such “purposeful [race] discrimination”153 that

147

Id.
Id. at 179 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
149 Id. at 179 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
150 Id. at 179–80 (some citations omitted).
151 See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)
(recognizing that “[t]he impact of the official action—whether it bears more heavily on
one race than another—may provide an important starting point”) (internal quotation
and citation omitted).
152 See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 n.25 (1979) (recognizing
that, while the foreseeability of a law’s disparate impact is inadequate to establish
discriminatory intent, it remains relevant).
153 Id. at 179.
148
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triggered strict scrutiny, despite the State’s “use of racial criteria” in its
redistricting decision.154
The plurality’s statements in UJO—and, even more, Justice
Stewart’s—strike modern ears as odd. Today, the distinction between
mere racial classification and invidious racial discrimination may seem
obvious. It is current hornbook law that a racial classification merely
triggers strict scrutiny rather than constituting the ultimate decision
about whether a given instance of discrimination is unconstitutional.155
Indeed, as a plurality of the Court explained in 1989, the strict scrutiny
that follows a conclusion of intentional (or explicit) race classification is
designed precisely to sift out benign uses of race from invidious ones.156
Thus, a finding that the government has intentionally classified is
merely the first step in the two-step judicial decision-making process, a
necessary but still preliminary conclusion that furnishes the foundation
for the application of the appropriate scrutiny level. In turn, it is the
application of that scrutiny that determines the ultimate conclusion
about the invidiousness (and hence unconstitutionality) of the
classification identified at the first step. The UJO plurality’s—and, even
more, Justice Stewart’s—conflation of the intent and ultimate
constitutionality questions157 is fundamentally incongruent with this
modern structure.158

154 Justice Stewart’s analysis cannot be read as reflecting a preliminary conclusion
that the state’s conceded use of race satisfied the intent requirement, followed by a
second conclusion that this use of race satisfied the applicable equal protection
standards for “racial discrimination.” Rather, he began his analysis by stating the
question as “whether the reapportionment plan represents purposeful discrimination
against white voters.” Id. (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)). He
concluded that it did not. Indeed, by concluding his analysis with the statement that the
fact that New York acted in response to the Department of Justice’s view about what the
Voting Rights Act requires “forecloses any finding that it acted with the invidious
purpose of discriminating against white voters.” Id. at 180. Justice Stewart all but
explicitly understood the discriminatory intent inquiry he had just performed as
equivalent to an inquiry into “invidious purpose.” Id.
155 See supra note 141 (quoting Professor Selmi’s explanation of this law).
156 Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he
purpose of strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the
legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect
tool.”).
157 See Haney-Lopez, supra note 142 at 1820 (“[F]ive Justices— . . . White, Stevens,
Rehnquist, Stewart, and Powell—thought [in UJO] that race-conscious remedies should
be treated just like every other use of race and evaluated for an intent to harm.”).
158 Indeed, in 1995 a Court adhering to this modern two-step approach overruled UJO
to the extent that it endorsed less than strict scrutiny in some cases involving intentional
race classifications. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 914–15 (1995).
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But that modern structure is of relatively recent vintage. The intent
test itself arose as a constitutional requirement only in the 1970s.159
More importantly, Davis and the intent requirement more generally160
predated the Court’s confrontation with race-based affirmative action.
It was the Court’s ultimate resolution of that confrontation decisively in
favor of a rule according all racial classifications the same level of (strict)
scrutiny161 that solidified the two-step process that constitutes the
modern rule: all intentional uses of race trigger strict scrutiny, but the
intent inquiry asks only about intent to classify—not intent that as a
matter of logic is necessarily invidious.162
By contrast, in a world in which it was not at all clear whether
race-based affirmative action would be considered constitutionally
problematic (and certainly not as problematic as Jim Crow laws and
other oppressive uses of race),163 one could see those two steps as really
one. In that alternative world, a search for “discriminatory intent” could
easily be understood as a search for “invidious intent.” Indeed, the
Court’s use of intent analysis before Davis—in particular, in race cases
in the two decades after Brown v. Board of Education—reveals the
Justices’ attempts to use the concept of intent to pierce the veil of facially
neutral government action that in fact sought to maintain the previously
explicit Jim Crow racial hierarchy.164 As Professor Haney-Lopez
documents, the Court’s use of the intent concept immediately after Davis
reflects similar anti-subordination concerns firmly grounded in

159

See, e.g., Eyer, supra note 141 at 34–48 (tracing the evolution of the Court’s
thinking in the 1970s toward a rule that both allowed heightened review of
classifications that reflected intentional classification and also disallowed such review
in cases featuring merely disparate effects).
160 Scholars often view the Court’s 1973 school segregation decision in Keyes v. Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) as a critical turning point in the Court’s adoption of an
intent requirement. See Mitchell Ducey, The Unitary Finding and the Threat of School
Resegregation: Riddick v. School Board, 65 N.C. L. REV. 617, 627–29 (1987) (tracing the
path from Keyes to Davis); Eyer, supra note 141, at 47 (noting the importance of Keyes
as a turning point).
161 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493–500 (plurality opinion) (setting forth and defending
that rule); see also Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (concluding that
that same rule applies to federal race-based affirmative action).
162 Recall that this modern structure features statements from the Court insisting
that strict scrutiny of intentional race classifications is not “strict in theory but fatal in
fact.” See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (“Strict scrutiny is not ‘strict
in theory, but fatal in fact.’”) (quoting Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 237 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).
163 See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (calling for some, but not the
strictest, scrutiny of race-based affirmative action set-asides).
164 See Eyer, supra note 141 at 15–22.
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real-world context165 Recall, for example, that in UJO, Justice White’s
plurality rejected the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment argument
because the state’s use of race to draw electoral district lines
“represented no slur or stigma”166 based on race. Even more explicitly,
Justice
Stewart’s
concurrence
answered
his
“purposeful
discrimination”167 question in the negative, despite his acknowledgment
that the state had used “racial criteria”168 to draw those lines.169

165

See Haney-Lopez, supra note 142 at 1816 (observing that cases decided a year
after Davis reflected a “contextual” approach to equal protection).
166 United Jewish Orgs., Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165 (1977) (plurality opinion).
167 Id. at 179–80 (Stewart, J., concurring).
168 Id.
169 One can also perceive this contextual analysis in Arlington Heights, in particular
in that case’s recognition that procedural or substantive irregularities might be
probative of discriminatory intent. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977); see also Selmi, supra note 88 at 304–05 (explaining that
“when legislatures deviate from customary practices where race may be a factor, and no
reasonable explanation for the departure is forthcoming, the legislature’s action is
understood against the historical fact that legislatures have often made distinctions
based on race in order to disadvantage minority groups. Other than our history of racial
discrimination, there is no reason that deviations from legislative procedures would be
relevant to proving intentional racial discrimination.”). One can also perceive such a
contextual analysis in Davis itself. In applying the discriminatory intent rule it had just
announced, Justice White’s majority opinion identified facts—the reasonableness of the
government’s goal in employing Test 21, the test’s ability to further that goal, the police
force’s recruitment efforts in the African American community, and the results of those
efforts—that “negated any inference that the Department discriminated on the basis of
race.” Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976). Just as with Professor Selmi’s
explanation of the procedural/substantive regularities issue in Arlington Heights, one
can understand Davis’ use of these facts in its discriminatory intent inquiry as reflecting
an analysis in which that inquiry targeted ultimate invidious intent rather than a mere
intent to classify based on race.
Indeed, one might be able to perceive a distant connection between these
understandings of irregular government action as invidious government action and
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701 (2007). In his dissent from the majority’s decision striking down two school
districts’ voluntary use of race in student assignment decisions to achieve integration,
Justice Breyer focused heavily on what can be described as the regularity, transparency,
and inclusiveness of the decisional processes those districts employed. See id. at 848
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Those characteristics seemed to persuade Justice Breyer that the
resulting government actions—their (partially) race-based student assignment
schemes—were not invidious. More generally, Justice Breyer argued that strict scrutiny
was not appropriate for these integrative uses of race. See id. at 823–37 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). One might combine this latter argument with his observations about the
districts’ decisional procedures to reach a conclusion that, in a distant echo of Arlington
Heights, the regularity of the government’s action sufficed to defeat any claim that the
government action in question reflected “invidious intent”—even though the districts’
actions explicitly employed “racial criteria.” UJO, 430 U.S. at 179 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
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But we know what happened instead. By 1989, a five-Justice
majority had coalesced for the proposition that any and all race-based
state government classifications trigger strict scrutiny.170 Six years
later, another bare majority pronounced that such scrutiny applied to
federal action as well.171 As if to emphasize the distance the Court had
traveled, the same year as that latter decision, the Court, again on a 5-4
vote, overruled UJO to the extent that it accorded less than strict scrutiny
to any legislative reapportionment based on race.172 All three decisions
triggered dissents objecting that the majority’s analyses failed to
distinguish between benign and invidious classifications at the crucial
stage of determining the level of scrutiny.173
This mechanization and decontextualization of the Court’s review
of racial classifications had a similar mechanizing effect on intent
doctrine. Gone were conclusions like Justice Stewart’s in UJO, that
acknowledged—indeed, even facial—uses of race might be deemed to
not constitute the “race discrimination” that triggers the highest judicial
scrutiny. Instead, any use of race for any reason triggers strict scrutiny,
with the invidiousness inquiry shunted off to the resulting strict
scrutiny analysis, where the deck is usually stacked against the
government, via unforgiving judicial ends-means examination of the
race classification.174
To be sure, some slippage in that otherwise strict scrutiny may
arise from the Court’s ad hoc watering down of the scrutiny it purports
to be performing.175 Moreover, the Court and individual Justices have
sometimes implied that race-conscious government action that does not
170

Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
172 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 914–15 (1995).
173 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 528, 552 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Adarand Constructors,
515 U.S. at 242–46, 264 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Miller, 515 U.S. at 945–48 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
174 For an example of such unforgiving scrutiny, see Croson, 488 U.S. at 498–508. One
might discern a similar dynamic in recent First Amendment doctrine, where the Court
has now concluded that facial content classifications, and not just laws that are justified
based on content, constitute the content discrimination that triggers strict scrutiny. See
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015).
175 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2215 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(accusing the majority of doing this); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 378–80 (2003)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (same). Again analogizing to First Amendment law, see
supra note 174 (also noting this analogy), in some cases dissenting Justices have accused
the majority of watering down the strict scrutiny that is now automatically required
whenever government facially regulates speech based on its content. See, e.g., WilliamsYulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 462–73 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (leveling this
accusation); see also Reed, 576 U.S. at 179–81 (Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment)
(expressing concern about this possibility in light of the majority’s rigid requirement of
strict scrutiny in every instance of facial content classification).
171
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directly classify based on race may escape strict scrutiny.176 But for the
most part, what we have now is an equal protection structure that turns
on whether the challenged law facially classifies or reflects a
classificatory intent. As critics have long pointed out, that structure has
no logical connection to what many consider to be the proper primary
subject of equal protection’s concern—not government action that
happens to classify based on race but rather government action that
oppresses or stigmatizes based on race177 or that is taken without
adequate consideration of the interests of historically oppressed
groups.178
Regents’ re-engagement with equal protection animus could help
change all that.
2. Animus and Intent: A Second Cut
A critical—indeed, the critical—part of Regents’ animus analysis is
the connection it draws between animus and discriminatory intent.
Section III.A provided a preliminary discussion of this relationship. But
now, armed with our understanding of the evolution of the intent
requirement, we can understand that connection more deeply. In turn,
that understanding will help us appreciate the implications of that
connection, which Part V discusses.
To state a complex idea briefly, animus can be understood as a
direct pathway to ultimate constitutional conclusions about the
invidiousness of government action challenged as violating equal
protection.179 Thus, animus plays the same role as the two-step process
of modern hornbook equal protection doctrine described above, the
first
of
which
inquires
into
the
existence
of
discriminatory/classificatory intent and the second, follow-on step of

176

See infra Section V.B (discussing those suggestions).
See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection,
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986) (explaining this perspective and arguing that it is both
more faithful to the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence and normatively attractive).
178 See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 51 (1977) (“If we were talking about some new form of
discrimination—say, discrimination against persons with red hair, or discrimination
against whites—then the ‘purpose’ doctrine would make eminent sense, as would its
corollary view that stigmatic harm can result only when there is a purpose to cause it.
But in America today, where the problem of racism is the problem of eliminating a
long-established stigma of inferiority—that is, a day-to-day assumption by many among
us that some of our citizens are not quite persons—it is as plain as a cattle prod that we
are talking about something quite different. A legislature oblivious to this existing
stigma of caste will nonetheless reinforce the stigma when it produces racially
discriminatory effects through ostensibly ‘neutral’ legislation.”).
179 See ARAIZA, supra note 11 (providing a fuller explanation of this idea).
177
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which applies the relevant level of scrutiny (assuming that the requisite
classificatory intent is found in the first step).
As illustrated by Professor Haney-Lopez’s discussion of the intent
requirement’s early years,180 that requirement could have been—and,
indeed, originally was—understood as combining those two inquiries.
That is, the intent inquiry as performed in cases such as UJO did not
focus on discerning whether the challenged law classified based on race,
thus triggering a second step of heightened scrutiny to determine its
ultimate constitutionality.
Rather, it focused simply and
comprehensively on determining whether the law was in fact invidious.
One can understand those early applications of the intent
requirement as analogous to animus analysis. Indeed, the language in
UJO implies such a similarity. Recall that Justice White’s plurality
opinion upheld New York’s race-based action because it “represented
no racial slur or stigma.”181 Similarly, Justice Stewart’s concurrence
answered what he called the “purposeful discrimination” inquiry in the
negative by concluding that the state had not engaged in “invidious
discrimination.”182 The intuitive connection between such language and
conclusions about animus is clear.183
The parallel extends beyond language to doctrinal structure and
content. Recall that UJO’s more holistic invidiousness analysis stands in
tension with the rigid, two-step approach that has come to characterize
equal protection doctrine. That latter approach relies heavily on the
application of a particular level of scrutiny as the critical ultimate step
once discriminatory intent is established. By contrast, the UJO approach
is more similar to animus doctrine.
First, as to structure, in contrast to the modern equal protection
approach, the canonical equal protection animus cases—Moreno,
Cleburne, Romer, and Windsor—either rejected heightened scrutiny
(Cleburne) or simply ignored the tier of scrutiny question (Moreno,
Romer, and Windsor). This feature establishes animus analysis as an
approach that, analogously to UJO, abjures a multi-step184 process in
180

See Haney-Lopez, supra note 142, at 1802–25 (discussing those early years).
See United Jewish Orgs., Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165 (1977) (plurality opinion).
182 Id. at 179–80 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
183 See also infra notes 228–32 (identifying specific connections between language
used in UJO and conclusions either explicit or implicit in the canonical animus cases).
184 The word “multi” is used instead of “two” because the suspect classification
approach could take up to three steps: concluding that a government action classified
on the alleged basis, determining whether that basis triggers heightened scrutiny, and
then, finally, applying that scrutiny. Indeed, if one subdivides the first of these steps into
two, reflecting Arlington Heights’ two-step burden shifting structure, the number of
steps increases to four.
181
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which ultimate questions of constitutionality are deferred to the second
step. Instead, just as UJO moved immediately to an ultimate
consideration of invidiousness, so too animus analysis skips the tiers of
scrutiny question and moves immediately to that same ultimate
question. Second, as to content, after Regents, both of these single-step,
holistic inquiries draw from the same evidentiary well—the Arlington
Heights factors.185 This parallel was only implicit before Regents.186
Now, thanks to Regents’ reborrowing from the Free Exercise Clause
animus cases, this additional similarity has become explicit.
Thus, the structure of animus analysis as it has evolved has come
to resemble the original structure of the discriminatory intent
requirement. Moreover, these two inquiries now rest on the same
evidentiary factors. The interesting question then becomes, what are
the implications of these emerging parallels?
V. IMPLICATIONS
The analysis in Part IV allows us now to appreciate and consider
the generative potential of Regents’ resurrection and clarification of
equal protection animus. We now have an analysis—agreed upon by a
majority of the Court even if one member of that majority disagreed
with its application187—that explicitly employs the discriminatory
intent factors from Arlington Heights in order to uncover animus. This
explicit comingling of the discriminatory intent and animus concepts
opens several theoretical, doctrinal, and litigatory possibilities. Some of
them may be welcome to equality advocates. Others may cause worry.
A. A Firmer Foundation for Animus Doctrine
One important implication of Regents’ analysis is that it legitimates
animus doctrine and places it on a more secure doctrinal footing. The
Court’s very recognition of the concept of animus, in a case in which it
did not have to reach out to engage that issue,188 establishes the
concept’s continued bona fides in the post-Kennedy era. That
recognition was not a given. After all, animus was an idea especially
185 Arlington Heights had been decided nearly two months before UJO. Compare Vill.
of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (decided
January 11, 1977), with UJO, 430 U.S. at 144 (decided March 1, 1977). It thus provided
the then very recently announced guideposts for the UJO inquiry. See UJO, 430 U.S.
at 179 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Arlington Heights).
186 See ARAIZA, supra note 11 at 137–38 (noting how various Arlington Heights factors
surfaced implicitly in the animus cases).
187 See supra note 3 (noting Justice Sotomayor’s position on the animus question in
Regents).
188 See supra notes 98–99.
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favored by now-retired Justice Kennedy. The Court’s liberals accepted
it as a way of creating majorities for the decisions in the gay rights cases,
and perhaps Justices on both wings tolerated it in Masterpiece in order
to create a majority without having to say more about the thorny debate
between religious liberty, expressive conduct, and the reach of public
accommodations laws.189 The Court’s acknowledgment of the plaintiffs’
animus claim in Regents reinforces that idea’s legitimacy. So does the
plurality’s treatment of it—that is, its consideration of the claim (even if
performed summarily) rather than a dismissive rejection accompanied
by warnings about how difficult it is to state such a claim.190 The Court’s
treatment of the animus claim in Regents will likely invite litigants to
raise such claims in the future.
In addition to acknowledging the legitimacy of the animus concept,
Regents also placed it on a firmer doctrinal footing. Ever since its
appearance in Moreno, equal protection animus has suffered from being
under-theorized.191 When the four-Justice plurality and Justice
Sotomayor’s dissent employed discriminatory intent analysis to decide
the animus claim in Regents, they provided a more predictable,
structured inquiry for uncovering animus. To be sure, that inquiry
reflects what the Court had implicitly done in earlier animus cases. Now,
however, it is explicit, and thus both more predictable and easier for
advocates to present to lower courts constrained by Supreme Court
precedent.
Moreover, Regents’ use of discriminatory intent analysis to decide
the animus claim renders animus analysis more objective. Critics of the
animus concept have long complained that it reflects, at base, nothing
more than a judicial conclusion that government has acted with a
subjectively bad intent.192 Those critics often argue that such a
conclusion is incoherent, citing the well-known objection to imputing
intent to multi-person decisional bodies, impersonal bureaucracies,
189 See supra Part III; see also Mark Strasser, Masterpiece of Misdirection?, 76 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 963, 974 (2019) (“The Masterpiece Cakeshop Court seemed to be trying to find
some kind of compromise position” between the positions of the same-sex couple,
supported by the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, and the baker); Aaron Streett,
Supreme Court Review: An Analysis of Masterpiece and Janus, 23 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 311,
312 (2018) (“In Masterpiece, Justice Kennedy similarly sought to forge a national
compromise in which the dignity of gay and lesbian persons is respected, while sincere
religious beliefs are protected and not equated by the government to bigotry.”).
190 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 111–12 (noting the options Chief Justice
Roberts had had he wished to discourage animus claims).
191 See, e.g., Susannah W. Pollvogt, Windsor, Animus, and the Future of Marriage
Equality, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 204, 206 (2013) (noting “the persistent uncertainty
surrounding [animus] doctrine’s precise contours”).
192 See, e.g., Smith, infra note 194.
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and, even entire electorates.193 Beyond such epistemological objections,
critics also object that animus accusations poison democratic discourse
because, given the common meaning of the word “animus,” they amount
to name-calling—i.e., claims that government and the social forces
influencing it are motivated by evil.194
Regents’ explicit absorption of the discriminatory intent factors
into animus analysis mitigates these objections.195 While even a
discriminatory intent inquiry requires a willingness to find “intent” in
the actions of a bureaucratic or multi-member political body, the
well-established set of Arlington Heights factors offers hope for a more
objective understanding of that concept,196 and now, after Regents, of
the related concept of animus. In particular, several of those
factors—most notably, the history of the issue in that decision-making
body, any procedural or substantive deviations reflected in the
challenged decision, and the extent of the decision’s disparate
impact—suggest a more institutional understanding of the intent
193

See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 647 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(objecting to the Court’s finding of discriminatory intent in a county’s continuation of an
at-large voting scheme that generated racially disparate impacts, on the ground that the
intent inquiry was incoherent).
194 For a notable statement of this objection, see Steven D. Smith, The Jurisprudence
of Denigration, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 675 (2014); see also KARST, infra note 199 (refencing
the “name calling” that results even from a finding of discriminatory intent). But this
common understanding need not be the only one, or even the best one. In other writing
I have argued that an objective approach to animus is available. Indeed, I have grounded
that argument on a claim that the best way to approach the animus question is by
employing the relatively objective Arlington Heights factors. See Araiza, Discontents,
supra note 106, at 184–85 (2019) (explaining the logical connection between the
animus inquiry and the Arlington Heights factors). Compare Steven D. Smith, Objective
Animus?, 71 FLA. L. REV. F. 51 (2020) (responding to my article by criticizing the animus
idea as overly subjective), with William D. Araiza, Objectively Correct, 71 FLA. L. REV. F. 68
(2020) [hereinafter Objectively] (replying to Professor Smith).
195 I have made this argument previously. See sources cited supra note 194.
196 See, e.g., Pers. Adm’r. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 n. 24 (1979) (observing
that “[p]roof of discriminatory intent must necessarily usually rely on objective factors,
several of which were outlined in Arlington Heights. The inquiry is practical.”) (citation
omitted); Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 TULANE L. REV. 1065, 1082–83 (1998)
(contrasting a later case’s turn to a more subjective “malice” approach to discriminatory
intent with the Arlington Heights inquiry based on “objective factors”); Louis Raveson,
Unmasking the Motives of Government Decisionmakers: A Subpoena for Your Thoughts?,
63 N.C. L. REV. 879, 964 n.500 (1985) (describing the Arlington Heights inquiry as
“objective”). To be sure, one might be surprised to encounter such an endorsement of
an objective inquiry in Feeney, the case that is often cited as the source of the Court’s
turn to a more subjective, malice-based approach to intent. Professor Haney-Lopez
notes the irony. See Haney-Lopez, supra note 142, at 1837 n. 251 (“Even as the text [in
Feeney] demanded proof of subjective malice, guilty footnotes acknowledged that
discriminatory purpose doctrine operated through inference from surrounding
circumstances—a ‘practical’ approach that examined a range of ‘objective’ contextual
factors, including harmful impact.”).
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concept, one less focused on the relevant decision-makers’ actual
mindsets.197 In making the intent (and now the animus) inquiries more
objective, those factors also at least mitigate the sting a discriminatory
intent or animus conclusion carries,198 even if, concededly, they do not
remove it.199 The resulting increased acceptability of an animus finding
further reinforces its grounding as a concept that is built to last.
That firmer grounding is a significant development. Since the
1980s, animus has emerged as an important alternative to the standard
suspect class equal protection structure that assigns and then applies a
level of scrutiny to a particular type of discrimination.200 That
structure—like the intent requirement, often criticized for its
rigidity201—has shown significant signs of obsolescence.202 Most
notably, the Court has not found a new suspect or quasi-suspect class
since the 1970s and has not performed a serious suspect class analysis
since Cleburne in 1985. Yet, during that period, the Court has on several
occasions ruled in favor of equal protection plaintiffs while either
rejecting or simply ignoring any claim of suspect class status.203 More
conceptually, the difficulties courts have experienced applying suspect
197 These features also render the inquiry less prone to the objection that a court can
never accurately determine an institution’s “intent.”
198 See Araiza, Objectively, supra note 194.
199 See, e.g., KENNETH KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CONSTITUTION 154 (1989) (“Perhaps any judicial finding of racial discrimination—even a
finding based on racially disparate effects that are insufficiently justified by the
state—will carry some implication of blame for government officials. But an inquiry
centered on motive guarantees that antagonisms will be intensified, for it forces the
litigants into name-calling on one side and self-righteousness on the other.”).
200 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440–42 (1985)
(explaining the status of that structure as of 1985).
201 Most notably, throughout his tenure on the Court, Justice Marshall objected to
what he often characterized as the rigidity of the tiered scrutiny structure. See, e.g.,
Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing
the Court’s “rigid . . . model” of tiered scrutiny); see also Andrew Siegel, Equal Protection
Unmodified: Justice John Paul Stevens and the Case for Unmediated Constitutional
Interpretation, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2339, 2344 n. 25 (2006) (citing scholars raising this
same critique).
202 See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748
(2011) (“Over the past decades, the Court has systematically denied constitutional
protection to new groups.”). This sentiment has existed for some time. See, e.g., Harris
M. Miller II, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to
Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 810 (1984) (“[I]t is
extremely unlikely that the current Court will declare any additional classifications to
be suspect.”).
203 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 629
(1996); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cty. Com., 488 U.S. 336 (1989); City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
579 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (voting to strike down a sodomy
ban on equal protection grounds).

ARAIZA (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

4/5/2021 4:55 PM

RESURRECTING ANIMUS

1023

class analysis have been apparent for some time and have undermined
its legitimacy.204
Looking forward, the Justices can expect to confront a variety of
new types of discrimination—that is, discrimination whose status has
not been already decided under the suspect class framework.205 Unless
the Court plans to resuscitate the suspect class approach it has ignored
for nearly a generation, it will either resort to ad hoc decision-making or
begin developing a new methodology.206 Animus can play at least
part207 of that role in equal protection208 doctrine. Regents’ effect of
placing animus doctrine on a firmer foundation can only help in that
process.

204 As early as 1980, Laurence Tribe questioned the coherence of political
process-based theories of constitutional interpretation, arguing that they reflected
value judgments such theories sought to avoid. See Laurence Tribe, The Puzzling
Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1075 (1980).
Even John Hart Ely’s creation of a theory of judicial review based on political process
insights conceded the difficulties of applying the Court’s version of such a theory. See
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ch.6 (1980). A newer
generation of scholars has found other problems with the Court’s version of suspect
class theory. See, e.g., Samuel Marcosson, Constructive Immutability, 3 U. PA. J. CON. L. 646
(2001) (observing that newer understandings of identity have put severe strain on the
Court’s focus on the immutability of a characteristic as relevant to the characteristic’s
status as suspect).
205 For discussions of a sampling of such emerging equal protection issues, see
RONALD DEN OTTER, IN DEFENSE OF PLURAL MARRIAGE (2015) (discussing discrimination
against polygamists); ANNA KIRKLAND, FAT RIGHTS: DILEMMAS OF DIFFERENCE AND PERSONHOOD
(2008) (discussing obesity discrimination); Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter,
Unprincipled Exclusions: The Struggle to Achieve Judicial and Legislative Equality for
Transgender People, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 37, 43 (2000) (discussing transgender
discrimination); Jessica Roberts, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act as an
Antidiscrimination Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 597 (2011) (discussing genetics
discrimination).
206 To be sure, it will likely continue using the results of its older suspect class
analysis to decide cases alleging discrimination, the suspectness of which the Court has
already determined.
207 Scholars have offered other theories that could supplement or supplant the tiered
scrutiny structure. See, e.g., SONU BEDI, BEYOND RACE, SEX, AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION: LEGAL
EQUALITY WITHOUT IDENTITY (2013) (offering a powers-based approach to equal
protection that asks, without reference to the group a challenged law burdens, whether
that law is based on a constitutionally impermissible rationale); Kenji Yoshino, A New
Birth of Freedom? Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 148 (2015) (identifying in
Obergefell v. Hodges a close intertwining of equal protection and substantive due process
reasoning).
208 Indeed, it could also play such a role in Religion Clause doctrine, as it already has
in cases such as Lukumi, Masterpiece, and Hawaii. The proper role for animus in Religion
Clause doctrine presents a question that is beyond the scope of this Article.
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B. Brass Tacks: Risks and Possibilities for Equality Advocates
In addition to the positive conceptual implications set forth above,
Regents’ connection of animus and discriminatory intent also raises
troubling possibilities for equality advocates litigating actual cases—but
also some intriguing ones. These possibilities flow not from how animus
claims may be litigated, now that the Court has endorsed using the
Arlington Heights factors to evaluate them, but rather from how more
conventional discriminatory intent cases may be litigated now that the
Court has connected analysis of those claims to analysis of animus
claims. Put more simply, the connection the Regents Court has drawn
between animus and discriminatory intent may have consequences that
flow in both directions. As Section V.A explained, intent doctrine may
influence the animus inquiry. But the animus inquiry may also influence
intent doctrine. This Section considers the implications of that latter
possibility.
1. Further Rigidifying the Intent Inquiry
One troubling consequence of the animus-intent connection may
be a further rigidifying of discriminatory intent analysis as grounded in
notions of subjective ill will. Recall that earlier I suggested that animus
analysis may benefit from its connection to discriminatory intent
doctrine, as that connection may mitigate some of the subjectivity
implicit in animus claims.209 But if animus doctrine may benefit from
having some of that subjectivity cleansed away by its association with
discriminatory intent doctrine, then, conversely, discriminatory intent
law may find itself sullied by its connection to an implicitly subjective
concept such as animus.
Such a development would likely dismay equality advocates.
Critics of discriminatory intent doctrine have argued that, at least since
the Court’s 1979 decision in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v.
Feeney,210 the Court has equated discriminatory intent with subjectively
willful action.211 Most notably, those critics have pointed to Feeney’s
209

See supra Section VI.A.
Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
211 See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, The Benign-Invidious Asymmetry in Equal Protection
Analysis, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 573, 578 n.28 (2003) (describing Feeney’s definition of
discriminatory intent as enacting a malice standard); Siegel, supra note 141, at 1134
(concluding that the Supreme Court’s discriminatory intent jurisprudence has evolved
into an insistence on something approaching “malice”). But see Brian Fitzpatrick, Strict
Scrutiny of Facially Race-Neutral State Action and the Texas Ten Percent Plan, 53 BAYLOR
L. REV. 289, 309 (2001) (“Contrary to the suggestions of some commentators, it is
irrelevant [to the discriminatory intent question] whether the state actors harbor ill will
or animus towards a particular race when passing legislation.”); David A. Strauss,
210
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(in)famous statement that, to satisfy the intent requirement,
government must have acted “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its
adverse effects upon an identifiable group”212 as a signal that the search
for discriminatory intent had devolved into a search for subjectively bad
motives. Given the criticism of this development,213 it is easy to
understand the fear that connecting the discriminatory intent idea to an
idea—animus—that is even more intuitively connected with subjective
bad intent will further raise the hurdle equality advocates must already
surmount to prove discriminatory intent.214
2. Legal Jujitsu: Using Animus to Rebut Attacks on
Race-Consciousness?
This fear is a reasonable one. But before considering it in more
detail, it is appropriate to consider whether the animus-intent
connection could somehow redound to the benefit of equality advocates
litigating discriminatory intent cases. In at least one, admittedly limited,
context, it might: if an equality litigator’s task is not to attack a facially
neutral government action that has racially disparate effects but instead
to defend a facially neutral government action taken for race-based
reasons, then, in a case of legal jujitsu, a connection between intent and
animus may prove helpful.215
Consider, for example, Texas’s Top Ten Percent Plan. That
program, which lurked in the background of the Fisher affirmative
action litigation that made two stops at the Supreme Court,216
guaranteed admission to the University of Texas at Austin to graduates
in the top ten percent of Texas high schools. As Justice Ginsburg argued
in her dissent in the first Fisher opinion, and as the full Court
acknowledged in the second, the Top Ten Percent Plan was enacted for
Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 937 (1989)
(contending that the Court’s “discriminatory intent test reflects a requirement of
impartiality: . . . invidious discrimination consists of a failure to be impartial”).
212 See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279.
213 See, e.g., sources cited at supra note 211; Haney-Lopez, supra note 142,
at 1833–37.
214 Cf. Selmi, Mistake, supra note 139, at 776 (citing, in the Title VII context, “the false
impression that disparate treatment equaled animus” as a result of advocates’ attempts
to expand the disparate impact theory of liability under that statute).
215 For example, one scholar who attacks the constitutionality of race-neutral
government action that was nevertheless taken for race-conscious reasons has argued
that the requisite discriminatory intent required in order to subject such actions to strict
scrutiny does not require a showing of subjective ill will. See Fitzpatrick supra note 211.
As the upcoming text will set forth, requiring a showing of invidiousness as a component
of the intent inquiry would help blunt such attacks.
216 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex.
(Fisher I), 570 U.S. 297 (2013).
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race-conscious reasons: the Texas legislature, knowing full well the
segregated status of Texas schools, sought to ensure at least a degree of
Black and Latino representation at the University of Texas by basing
admission in part on graduation in the top ten percent from any Texas
high school.217
Or consider Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District Number 1.218 That case involved school districts’ voluntary use
of race in student assignment decisions219 in order to integrate the
schools in each district. While a five-Justice majority struck down the
districts’ actions, Justice Kennedy, the fifth vote for that result,
nevertheless maintained that districts could take race-conscious actions
to achieve integration, as long as those actions were race-neutral—that
is, as long as they did not involve the actual use of race when assigning
individual students.220 Thus, Justice Kennedy explained that, for
example, districts could legitimately make school siting decisions with
an eye to the resulting student racial demographics that would flow
from such decisions.221 Just as with the Top Ten Percent Plan, Justice
Kennedy’s model for constitutionally valid conduct contemplates
race-consciousness but not actual use of race in individual decisions.222
Do such uses of race violate equal protection, or at least trigger
heightened scrutiny? Scholars have raised these questions.223 In
answering them, one might hearken back to UJO. The State of New York
217 See Fisher I, 570 U.S. at 334, 335–36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Fisher II, 136 S. Ct.
at 2213.
218 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
219 The use of race was voluntary in the sense that neither district in the case was
then under court order to correct an adjudged violation of Brown’s rule against de jure
segregation. The Seattle district at issue in the case had been sued for segregating but
had entered into a consent decree, while the Jefferson County, Kentucky (Louisville)
district had been adjudged guilty of segregation but had been released from judicial
supervision upon a finding that it had achieved desegregation “to the greatest extent
practicable.” Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 716; id. at 711–18 (setting forth the general
facts); id. at 808–11 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting the lawsuits against the Seattle
district and the settlement agreements to which the district agreed).
220 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 782, 788–89 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
221 See id.
222 For a broader discussion of programs of this sort, see Reva Siegel, Race Conscious
but Race Neutral: The Constitutionality of Disparate Impact in the Roberts Court, 66 ALA.
L. REV. 653 (2015).
223 For a defense of the Top Ten Percent Plan in particular, see David Hinojosa, Of
Course the Texas Top Ten Percent Plan is Constitutional . . . And It’s Pretty Good Policy, Too,
22 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 1 (2016). For a canvassing of the somewhat mixed scholarly
views on the constitutionality and intent questions plans like Texas’s raise, see id. at 4–5
n.17. For statements by scholars suggesting that the Texas plan does in fact classify
based on race, see Dorf, infra note 228; Fitzpatrick, supra note 211.
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in UJO, the State of Texas in the Top Ten Percent Plan, and the school
districts in Justice Kennedy’s Parents Involved hypothetical were all
aware of race, and indeed acted to achieve race-conscious
results—respectively, increased minority representation in the
legislature, increased minority presence in the University of Texas’s
student body, and a particular racial mix in the individual schools within
each district.224 If one follows the path marked by the Justices in UJO,
the Top Ten Percent Plan and Justice Kennedy’s hypothetical
race-conscious school siting decisions would presumably be upheld
because they, like New York’s redistricting plan, “represented no racial
slur or stigma”225 and lacked an “invidious purpose,”226 even if they
reflected “awareness”227 of race.228
Regents could conceivably support such a conclusion. Its use of the
factors relevant to discriminatory intent in its animus analysis raises the
potential for animus-style reasoning to migrate into the modern
discriminatory intent inquiry. In other words, Regents’ borrowing of the
discriminatory intent factors as part of its animus analysis could open
the door to a reverse borrowing, in which factors relevant to an animus

224 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 211 (arguing that the Texas Top Ten Percent Plan
is unconstitutional because it constitutes facially race-neutral government action that is
motivated by a desire to achieve race-based effects and achieves such effects, and in turn
fails strict scrutiny). In March 2021 a lawsuit was filed challenging a selective public
high school’s move to a different set of admissions criteria, alleging that the new criteria,
while facially race-neutral, were motivated by a desire to alter the racial makeup of the
class. That suit may well shed light on the constitutionality of plans such as the Texas
Top Ten Percent Plan. See Ilya Somin, Important New Lawsuit Challenges Attempted
Racial Balancing at Prominent Selective Virginia Public High School, REASON: THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Mar. 16, 2021, 4:59 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2021/03/16/
important-new-lawsuit-challenges-attempted-racial-balancing-at-prominentselective-virginia-public-high-school (discussing the implications of this lawsuit).
225 United Jewish Orgs., Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165 (1977) (plurality opinion).
226 Id. at 179 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
227 Id. (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
228 To be sure, one important difference between UJO and the two more modern
examples is that the latter do not involve the explicit assignment of persons or allocation
of benefits by race. Nevertheless, at least two scholars have argued that the Top Ten
Percent Plan (and, by extension, the hypothetical race-conscious actions suggested by
Justice Kennedy in Parents Involved) do in fact satisfy the discriminatory intent test as it
is currently understood, and thus constitute racial classifications under modern law. See
Michael C. Dorf, Is the Texas Ten Percent Plan “Race Neutral?”, VERDICT JUSTIA (Dec. 16,
2015), https://verdict.justia.com/2015/12/16/is-the-texas-ten-percent-plan-raceneutral; Fitzpatrick, supra note 211. If those scholars are correct, then such government
conduct would be subject to the same question one might ask about New York’s
race-based redistricting in UJO: are such plans automatically subject to strict scrutiny as
intentional racial classifications, or are they better analyzed by asking the questions
(about stigma and invidiousness) asked by members of the UJO majority?
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determination—considerations about demeaning,229 stigmatizing,230
subordinating,231
or
otherwise
invidious232
government
action—become relevant to a finding of discriminatory intent. On this
approach, plans such as the Top Ten Percent Plan would
survive—indeed, would be found not even to reflect discriminatory
intent—if they did not impose the sort of stigma or reflect the sort of
invidiousness the plurality and Justice Stewart, respectively, found
similarly lacking in UJO.233
Such a development could open the door to broader, longer-term
reforms in equal protection law. Most notably, a move to an
animus-based understanding of discriminatory intent—or perhaps a
complete collapsing of the discriminatory intent idea into an inquiry
that fundamentally sounds in invidiousness rather than classification
simpliciter—could provide the foundation for a more hospitable attitude
toward affirmative action. Recall that both Davis and UJO were decided
before the Court’s first full confrontation with the constitutionality of
race-based affirmative action in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke.234
The Court’s more contextual understanding of race
discrimination in those pre-Bakke cases—particularly in UJO235—is
reflected in Justice Brennan’s opinion for four Justices in Bakke. Among
its other features, Justice Brennan’s opinion sought to distinguish
229 Cf. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 772 (2013) (concluding that Section 3
of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) “demeans” same-sex married couples and
“humiliates” their children).
230 Cf. id. at 770 (concluding that Section 3 of DOMA “impose[s] a stigma” on married
same-sex couples).
231 Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (“Amendment 2 classifies
homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to
everyone else.”).
232 Cf. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (concluding
that the challenged government permit denial rested on “irrational prejudice” against
the intellectually disabled); id. at 448 (noting the city council’s reliance on constituent
fear and dislike of the intellectually disabled and rejecting it as a justification for the
permit denial); United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)
(warning that “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group” is an insufficient
justification for government action).
233 For a more conventional application of the Arlington Heights factors, leading to
the same conclusion about the Texas plan’s lack of discriminatory intent, see Hinojosa,
supra note 223, at 11–18.
234 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269 (1978). The Court considered
an affirmative action case before Bakke (and Davis) but dismissed it on mootness
grounds. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1974).
235 See supra notes 147–50. Davis presents a slightly more complicated picture. For
an argument that Davis also reflected a more contextual approach to the intent question,
see Selmi, Mistake, supra note 139, at 728–30; see also supra note 169 (explaining how
Arlington Heights and Davis can also be understood, at least in part, as employing a
context-sensitive approach).
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between race-based set-asides based on the relative political power of
the groups those set-asides benefited and burdened, and inquired into
whether U.C. Davis’s set-aside had the effect of demeaning either Allan
Bakke or the beneficiaries of the program (by implying that they had
inferior qualifications for admission).236 Such concerns can easily be
mapped onto Justice Stewart’s inquiry into whether the state’s use of
race in UJO was “invidious”237 and the UJO plurality’s investigation into
whether the state’s use of race imposed a “slur” or a “stigma” based on
race.238
Of course, Justice Brennan’s approach to affirmative action failed to
carry the day.239 Instead, the Court ultimately settled on what has
become the familiar two-step approach to equal protection. The first
step in that approach seeks to determine whether the challenged law
either facially classifies or reflects discriminatory intent, rigidly
described as an inquiry into classificatory intent.240 It is only the second
step—application of the relevant scrutiny level—that seeks to
determine the actual invidiousness of any such classification.241 But if
236 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 361 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (recognizing the risk that a race-based set-aside might harm the most
politically powerless subgroup of whites); id. at 374 (concluding the Davis program did
not raise that risk); id. at 375 (concluding that operation of the program did not
stigmatize Bakke himself); id. at 375–76 (concluding that operation of the program did
not stigmatize its intended minority beneficiaries).
237 United Jewish Orgs., Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 179–80 (Stewart, J., concurring in
the judgment).
238 Id. at 165.
239 For the importance of the Court’s approach to affirmative action to this new
understanding of the intent requirement, see Haney-Lopez, supra note 142, at 1829 (In
Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), “Stewart, joined by Powell and the
three other Nixon appointees, used Powell’s equal protection story in Bakke to rewrite
the Fourteenth Amendment in terms of a basic concern with the act of classification. . . .
In this narrative, the simple use of race, without more, triggered constitutional
suspicion. . . . Stewart ostensibly reached back to Brown v. Board of Education for this
radical proposition. Yet, clearly the appropriate citation was Powell’s lone opinion in
Bakke.”).
240 See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 88, at 290 (“The Court’s intentional discrimination
cases can be divided into two familiar categories: those that involve facially
discriminatory classifications and those that are facially neutral. For facially
discriminatory practices and policies, the element of intent is inferred from the
language, and the Court engages in no additional inquiry to determine whether the
statute or policy was discriminatory. . . . More commonly, statutes and policies
challenged as discriminatory are facially neutral, and the court must infer intent from
the fact of differential treatment.”).
241 See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(justifying strict scrutiny for all racial classifications in order to “smoke out” invidious
uses of race). Note, however, that even the type of scrutiny Croson called for sought to
uncover invidiousness not directly but rather though the ends-means analysis employed
via strict scrutiny.
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discriminatory intent comes (again) to be understood as an inquiry not
into classificatory intent but rather into invidiousness, then the door
might be opened to a reconsideration of the traditional two-step test
that renders affirmative action so constitutionally precarious. Such a
recasting of the intent requirement into a single holistic inquiry into
ultimate invidiousness could follow from that requirement’s new
connection to animus-style reasoning.
To be sure, nobody should think that this doctrinal opening would
change the minds of Justices who harbor a normative belief that all race
classifications merit strict scrutiny.242 On this issue, at least, legal
doctrine may present pathways for Justices already inclined to search
for a route to a particular destination; it does not, however, compel them
to begin that journey. Nevertheless, the Court’s recognition of the
connection between discriminatory intent and animus offers a path to a
destination that is more tolerant243 of race-based affirmative action,
should the Justices wish to take it.
3. Two Cheers for Regents
This prospect of a better eventual future for affirmative action may
strike many as theoretical and speculative cold comfort—if even
that244—when compared with the likelihood that a closer connection
242 See, e.g., Haney-Lopez, supra note 142, at 1836 (noting that “colorblindness was
attractive insofar as it seemed to confirm [the Justices’] basic intuitions” about racial
equality).
243 To be sure, a frank, explicit invidiousness inquiry into affirmative action programs
would not necessarily be completely deferential. There is room within that inquiry for
a starting presumption that such programs, by using a potentially problematic tool such
as race, must demonstrate their non-invidiousness. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359–62 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (acknowledging the reasons that even benignly justified uses of race must
be subject to meaningful scrutiny); see also Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
535 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing approvingly Justice Brennan’s opinion in
Bakke). But the difference is that this inquiry would be more frankly aimed, from the
start, at the program’s invidiousness, rather than starting with a rigid, acontextual
inquiry into whether the law classifies on the basis of race, followed by a strict
examination of the law’s ends and means that purports to be the same regardless of the
government’s justifications for its use of race.
244 For example, Professor Michael Selmi argues that the actual results of
discrimination cases would not have changed had the Court adopted or more broadly
employed an effects rather than intent test, since the Court would have still applied its
fundamentally limited understanding of what constitutes discrimination. See Selmi,
supra note 88, at 338. If one accepts his analysis, then one might also conclude that the
Court would find a way to reject affirmative action plans even if it ostensibly applied a
more holistic inquiry into invidiousness rather than the rigid and harsh ends-means test
known as strict scrutiny. Indeed, the statements of individual Justices in the canonical
affirmative action cases suggest that members of the Court held and continue to hold
strong beliefs about the fundamental normative wrongness of any race-based

ARAIZA (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

4/5/2021 4:55 PM

RESURRECTING ANIMUS

1031

between discriminatory intent and animus will make it harder for
equality litigators to prove the former as it becomes freighted with the
latter’s intimations of bad subjective motives.245 To repeat, that risk is
real. Equality advocates may well conclude that any collateral or
long-term benefit this reverse borrowing provides to traditional
equality claims are simply too speculative or theoretical to warrant
welcoming the development Regents hearkens.

government action. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349–50 (2003) (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting speech by Frederick Douglass as
part of an anguished protest against the concept of racial preferences); Richmond v. J. A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 518 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (“The moral imperative of racial neutrality is the driving force of the
Equal Protection Clause.”); id. at 527–28 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It is plainly true that in
our society blacks have suffered discrimination immeasurably greater than any directed
at other racial groups. But those who believe that racial preferences can help to ‘even
the score’ display, and reinforce, a manner of thinking by race that was the source of the
injustice and that will, if it endures within our society, be the source of more injustice
still.”).
245 This is not to say that discrimination cases would necessarily be significantly
easier to win under an alternative standard. See, e.g., Selmi, Mistake, supra note 139, at
734 (“[O]ne of the central attractions to disparate impact [employment discrimination]
claims is the perception that they are easier to prove than claims of intentional
discrimination, given that intent is often difficult to establish through circumstantial
evidence. In reality, however, the opposite is true. Disparate impact claims are more
difficult to prove than standard intentional discrimination claims.”); see also Selmi, supra
note 88, at 335–36 (“Importantly, the Court’s doctrine has not gone awry because of its
focus on intent. The Court’s restricted notion of intentional discrimination suggests that
even if had adopted an effects test, the results would likely have been the same.”).
Professor Selmi made this latter claim in the context of a more general investigation of
both statutory nondiscrimination and equal protection standards. Whether or not
Professor Selmi is accurate in his conclusions presents a question that is far beyond the
scope of this Article. See Selmi, Mistake, supra note 139, at 704, n.10 & 12 (citing scholars
calling for increased use of disparate impact theory in a variety of equality contexts).
A related, but distinct, objection holds that animus doctrine should be disfavored
because it infects not discriminatory intent doctrine, but rational basis review. This
argument maintains that social justice movements can make use of rational basis review
to obtain early litigation victories which can later ripen into broader judicial recognition
of protected class status or other more broadly applicable doctrinal and even legislative
innovations. This argument urges that the canonical animus cases be read instead as
rational basis cases, in order to allow the accretion of such rational basis victories and
thus the establishment of a judicial tradition of meaningful rational basis review that
will ultimately benefit social movements. For a discussion of this issue, compare Katie
Eyer, The Canon of Rational Basis Review, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1317, 1322 (2018)
(making this argument), with Araiza, Discontents, supra note 106 (engaging Professor
Eyer). Additionally, compare Katie Eyer, Animus Trouble, 48 STET. L. REV. 215 (2019)
(responding), with William D. Araiza, Response: Animus, Its Critics, and Its Potential, 48
STET. L. REV. 275 (2019) (replying).
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Still, we face the future with the doctrine we have, not the doctrine
we would like to have.246 In prior writing, I have strenuously urged
explicit adoption of a robust but properly limited animus doctrine.247 At
this very early stage of the Court’s development of its explicit connection
between discriminatory intent and animus, it may be appropriate to
cheer the Court on but monitor developments carefully as the
implications of the doctrine Regents has helped create slowly take
shape.
Two generations ago, Justice Jackson reminded us of something
that Justice Cardozo cautioned about even earlier: doctrine matters.248
Legal doctrine possesses its own momentum, which may generate
results with one political or social valence during one era, and results
with very different valences in another.249 Regents’ treatment of the
plaintiffs’ animus claim merits applause for both its current impact and
its long-term potential. Nonetheless, litigants, judges, and perhaps
especially scholars advocating for a robust role for animus in equal
protection law have a responsibility to ensure that Regents’ surprising
turn to animus remains good news, rather than good news that soon
turns bad.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is much to welcome in Regents’ resurrection of the animus
concept and its analysis connecting it to discriminatory intent. That
resurrection places animus claims back on litigators’ menu of options.
The Court’s analysis connecting animus to discriminatory intent, in turn,
provides a firm and coherent grounding for the animus concept and
246

This statement alludes to then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s infamous
quotation, explaining the lack of preparedness for the second Iraq War: “You go to war
with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time.”
See Eric Schmitt, Iraq-Bound Troops Confront Rumsfeld Over Lack of Armor, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/08/international/middleeast/
iraqbound-troops-confront-rumsfeld-over-lack-of.html.
247 See William D. Araiza, Keynote Speech: Call It by Its Name, 48 STET. L. REV. 181, 193
(2019) (“[C]reating an animus doctrine that is both fit for and limited to its appropriate
tasks will help ensure the doctrine’s vitality. It will accomplish that goal exactly because
that doctrine will be limited enough to apply only when, in fact, it should apply.”)
(emphasis in original).
248 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 242, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) (cautioning that a legal principle announced in judicial opinions “lies about
like a loaded weapon” ready for use by others); BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (noting the “tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limits of
its logic”); see also Eyer, supra note 141 (concluding that the development of intent
jurisprudence played a progressive role in race equality litigation in the 1960s and early
1970s but then evolved to play a more restrictive role after Davis and especially Feeney).
249 See Eyer, supra note 141.
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raises the prospect of assisting equality claims both in the short and long
term. These developments make it possible for the animus idea to
evolve into at least a supplement to the Court’s more traditional equal
protection jurisprudence.
That is welcome news when that
jurisprudence—in particular, the Carolene Products-based structure of
suspect classes and tiered scrutiny—has shown unmistakable signs of
decrepitude.
At the same time, discriminatory intent jurisprudence may benefit
from a newly explicit connection with animus. That connection may
point the way toward a more nuanced, contextual understanding of
intent, consistent with the Court’s application of the intent requirement
in the years immediately after its establishment. Thus, connecting
animus to intent may redound to the benefit not just of the former but
also the latter. The Court’s action in resurrecting animus and connecting
it to discriminatory intent may thus help renew that latter idea.
That resurrection and renewal, however, also raises risks to
equality. Those risks require constant monitoring—by lawyers
considering whether and how to employ the tools the Court has
provided, judges responding to lawyers’ deployment of those tools, and
scholars evaluating the results and recommending the next steps.
Regents is not the end of the evolution of animus. It is not even the
beginning of the end. Instead, by bringing the concept into a new era,
both in terms of its doctrinal grounding and its acceptance by a
post-Kennedy Court, it is the end of the beginning.

